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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

EMPIRICAL ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF
REVENUE DIVERSIFICATION IN THE U.S. STATES
This dissertation seeks to make significant progress in the quantitative study of
public revenue diversification. In the past, this phenomenon has been studied in various
and disparate contexts, using a variety of empirical methods. In particular, two different
hypotheses, from different subfields of public finance, have been advanced. One of these
perspectives, coming from political economy, holds that revenue diversification is a tool
for opportunistic policymakers to artificially expand public revenues (and thus
expenditures) for electoral gain. The other, from a public financial management tradition,
holds that revenue diversification is a constructive management tool which facilitates
greater revenue stability for the sake of more efficient and effective budgeting processes.
Utilizing a deep panel of public revenue data from the U.S. states, this dissertation
seeks to offer contextualization and explanation of divergent results in the extant
literature. Three different empirical issues are specifically addressed, in each of the major
substantive chapters: inconsistency in the measurement of revenue diversity, underconsideration of endogeneity in the existent models of diversification, and the underlying
revenue volatility inherent to the reliance on particular revenue mechanisms. The results
of this dissertation suggest that the existing theoretical expectations (and their resultant
empirical results) are substantially oversimplified, and do not adequately address the
empirical advanced propositions within.
While each chapter reaches its own individual conclusion in response to the
limitations of the existent literature, the main takeaway from the dissertation is that the
starting point for revenue diversification must be considered. Diversifying from an
instable status quo to a more stable mix of revenues would logically result in a more
stable revenue stream. But if the governmental entity is diversifying away from a reliance
on stable tax and revenue instruments, as seems to be the case with most U.S. states,
diversification is likely to lead to increased volatility. This is the opposite result predicted
by most of the existent literature, but is empirically verified here, with substantial rigor.

A large part of the problem seems to be the inconsistency and incompleteness of
the standard measure of revenue diversity (a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of
concentration). This dissertation offers pointed suggestions of how this measurement
could be amended, reconsidered, and alternately employed in the future. However, the
major theoretical and empirical contribution is that revenue diversity must be considered
as part of a full revenue system, and that isolating it as only part of said yields results
which cannot be fully trusted. Expecting such endogeneity, the simultaneously derived
results are often the very opposite of theoretical expectations.
Most importantly, the results of the revenue-complexity hypothesis are subverted,
offering an alternative explanation by which revenue diversification is a rational response
to the external demand for greater government spending. Additionally, while there is
evidence that policymakers respond to greater volatility by diversifying the revenue
stream, it appears that this diversification does not lead to greater revenue stability at the
state level.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1 The Role of Revenue Diversification in Public Finance

Over the past several decades a great deal of scholarly attention in the realm of public
finance has been devoted to studying the phenomenon of “revenue diversification,” which is
the tendency of political jurisdictions to rely on an overall revenue stream that is comprised
of a greater number of individual revenue mechanisms in a more evenly distributed manner,
as opposed to relying overwhelmingly on one or two particular mechanisms.1 Naturally,
the first question that arose in response to the behavior of revenue diversification was,
simply, why? For what purpose might a government choose to pursue a more diversified
revenue structure? As will be introduced below, there are major competing explanations in
the scholarly literature as to what this explanation might be.
The origins of this question are rooted in observations of the public revenue stream in
the United States at a sub-national level – either state or local. As introductory students
to public finance and budgeting learn to this day, each level of government in the United
States has traditionally relied mostly on its own favored revenue mechanism: the individual
income tax for the federal government (after 1917), the sales tax for state governments, and
the property tax for local governments. The operative word in the preceding sentence,
however, is traditionally. Outside of the federal government, which continues to be funded
1 For

the purposes of this dissertation, a “revenue mechanism” is defined as any individual source of revenue with a unique source or base. For example, separate revenue mechanisms that clearly qualify within the
realm of taxation would be the income tax, the sales tax, and the property tax. Outside of taxes, as conventionally perceived, revenue mechanisms can include a host of fees and charges collected by the government
for particular services provided.

1

in large part by the income tax and the very closely related payroll taxes tied to individual
programs, this tripartite distinction has become much more inaccurate in recent decades.
Most, but not all, state governments now collect their own income taxes, often to levels
that substantially surpass the amount of revenue raised from the sales tax, which is their
traditional provenance. Even some local governments (usually larger cities) collect their
own income taxes. Many states also allow local governments to collect sales tax above
and beyond the state tax rate (that is, if the state sales tax rate exists at all, which in a few
states it does not). Property tax, by and large, continues to be the go-to source of revenue
for local governments of all varieties (municipalities, townships, counties, special districts)
but historically this was also a major source of state revenues and many states continue to
assess their own property tax, beyond that collected by the local governments. This is to
say nothing of the reliance on other non-tax revenue mechanisms, such as user fees and
charges, intergovernmental revenue, and debt.2 In short, the nature of the public revenue
stream at the sub-national level is extremely non-uniform in the United States, and with
that non-uniformity naturally comes an accompanying level of variation in the amount of
revenue diversification that exists. This reality necessitates the principal question posed
above, and it also means that this level of analysis provides a prime laboratory for studying
the reasons why diversification exists and what its effects might be.
Now that the motivation for the question has been established, a discussion of its an2 Whether

intergovernmental revenue and debt should be treated as distinct revenue mechanisms remains
a contentious issue, as will be discussed in later chapters. However, they do provide alternative sources of
revenue, and sub-national government reliance on them varies substantially, similar to the own-source current
mechanisms.

2

swers is possible. Much greater and more detailed attention is devoted to these answers in
the following chapter, but a very brief overview shall be provided here for the purposes of
motivating the dissertation, as a whole. The scholarly literature, as it exists, essentially proposes two separate answers, each answer having its own adherents and empirical evidence
to support it.
The first of these explanations, chronologically, comes out of the early roots of public
choice (or, as the field has terminologically evolved into today, political economy). This
line of thinking argues that revenue diversification (or revenue complexity, as it was originally called) results from the self-interested attempts of elected politicians to maximize
public expenditures for their own electoral benefit. The argument is that if the revenue
stream is sufficiently diversified among many diffuse forms of taxation, voting citizens
won’t fully rationalize their overall tax burden and will thus respond positively to the increased spending that results. This benefits incumbent politicians, which is the driving
motivation behind the model. This is one particular manifestation of the concept of fiscal
illusion in the public financial sector, commonly termed the “revenue-complexity hypothesis”.
The alternate explanation, which has gained a great deal more traction in the public
financial management literature, as opposed to the political economy sub-field in public
economics, is that governments choose to diversify because doing so minimizes the adverse
effects of revenue volatility. The process of public budgeting is a difficult one, not least
because revenues can often be dramatically affected by macroeconomic conditions that
3

are largely outside the control of the decision-making body (especially when discussing
sub-national governments). The idea of public revenue diversification for this purpose
is adopted from the corporate finance literature and its focus on a diversified investment
portfolio. Since each individual revenue mechanism relies on a unique base, the idea is
that diversifying the revenue stream among as many bases as possible, rather than relying
exclusively on one or two, reduces the overall risk of dramatic fluctuations in total revenue
due to macroeconomic fluctuations.
Both arguments are logically consistent if certain premises are accepted and both carry
a certain level of intuitive appeal, explaining the amount of research that exists to illustrate
their effects in the real world. In the current literature, however, these two explanations are
often posed as definitive alternatives to one another, and most published research takes up
the side of one or the other, providing predominantly positive evidence to the detriment of
the alternative argument. The result of this practice is that, fully considered, we are not
much closer to definitively identifying the role of revenue diversification in the public financial system. Proponents of the revenue-complexity hypothesis continue to produce new
and innovative evidence for its existence. Meanwhile, proponents of the revenue volatility
argument continue to produce their own evidence, and generally present it in direct contrast
to the evidence of the opposing camp. The fundamental question of why revenue diversification exists remains ultimately unsettled, and it is for this purpose that this dissertation
exists.
A preponderance of the empirical research in this area utilizes panel datasets of fi4

nancial data from subnational governments – either localities or states – to analyze the
hypotheses derived from the questions posed above. Although the basic methodology may
be the same, however, specific practices can vary widely. Such lack of uniformity in the
existent empirical research further confuses the discussion of divergent results in the literature. This dissertation addresses some of these specific issues and proposes new methods
with which to address them, and it provides new empirical evidence that results from employing such methods. While panel data methods such as fixed effects are not universal,
their continued prevalence in the literature necessitates a more detailed consideration of
some of the methodological issues that can result. Insights and modifications are drawn
from neighboring fields of study, including other areas of public economics and macroeconomics. Throughout, special attention is paid to the prospect of even more innovative
solutions to the challenges posed by studying this phenomenon, which may form the basis
for future research.

1.2 Why States?

This dissertation analyzes the phenomenon of revenue diversification at the level of U.S.
states. As mentioned, a great deal of the diversification literature exists at the level of
either the U.S. states or localities. Clearly, there are advantages and challenges to both
levels. Studying the trend at the level of localities provides a great deal more observations,
because there simply are so many more local governments than state governments in the
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United States. Additionally, by nature of the very number, there is even more variance to
exploit in localities. However, data is much more limited at the local level. Regarding the
financial variables alone, the Census of Governments from the U.S. Census Bureau, the goto source for nation-wide public financial data, conducts a full census on local government
finance only every five years, those ending in “2” or “7,” going back to 1972.3 Meanwhile,
attempts to incorporate control variables such as demographics, detailed economic conditions, and political control over relevant institutions becomes even more infeasible at the
local level, since such data are often unavailable. A fully-realized empirical model of local governments incorporating panel data often necessitates that the research is limited to
specific states for shorter stretches of time, resulting in questions of generalizability.
Additionally, comparison of local governments across states is near impossible, since
local governments are “creatures of the state” and subject to all state impositions as to what
they may or may not do when it comes to raising revenues. Even within individual states,
different local governments can be subject to extremely diverse requirements regarding
revenue acquisition. Across state borders, adequately comparing between them becomes
prohibitive. The natural response to this challenge is to only analyze governments within
one particular state, as many studies have done. This, however, raises additional issues of
generalizability.
Analysis at the state level comprises its own challenges, namely that the number of ob3A

number of localities are surveyed in the intervening years to construct state-level aggregates of local
government finance for each and every year, but this sample is unstable and, if seeking consistent representation across all years, skewed toward the largest of cities.
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servations is so much smaller. However, there are are also noted advantages. Data are much
more complete and available at this level. The Census of Governments collects state-level
data every year; depending on the variables required, this can stretch back (intermittently)
to 1902, but full data have been collected in a consistent and complete fashion since the
1970s, annually. As will be seen, this consistency of annual data will become extremely
important to the empirical exercises within, since many of the models rely on a precisely
specified structure of lagged variables. Using data that only exists in full every five years
(as is the case with the local finance data) would severely hamper the power of the analyses contained within. Furthermore, relevant demographic, economic, and political control
variables are also readily available at the state level, allowing for more complete empirical
models that are less prone to omitted variable bias as a result of unavailable data.
In applied public financial research, there is often a concern that restricting the level
of analysis to only states or only localities is problematic, since different states allocate
the responsibilities between the two levels of government differentially. When considering
individual expenditure items, this is certainly valid; State A may spend more than State B
on a given budget item simply because State A retains more responsibility for such funding,
whereas State B has chosen to decentralize the spending to the local level. When dealing
with these particular revenue-side variables, however, this concern is substantially, though
not entirely, reduced. As will be elaborated in much greater detail in the chapters the follow,
the principle variables of interest relate only to the revenue side of the equation as it stands:
how large it is, how volatile it is, and how it is structured. Applying panel data methodology
7

at the state level, any differences in the allocation of responsibilities between states and
localities are automatically controlled for, and it is only the effect of these revenue-specific
variables that come into play. Regardless of how big State A is relative to State B, due to
a difference in allocation between levels of government, the effects of diversification on
government size and revenue volatility over time are thus consistent.
Finally, in addition to the fact that states provide the opportunity for a much more complete and usable dataset for the empirical exercises contained within, it must also be noted
that states, in and of themselves, are important and worthy of study. They provide a number of essential public services, and comprise no small part of the overall tax and public
revenue burden of U.S. citizens. After the federal government, the state government is that
which the average citizen is most aware, at least in broad terms. The purpose here is to
exploit the completeness of state-level data in order to address issues in the existing literature regarding revenue diversification. Ideally, this will provide a springboard for similar
research at other levels of analysis, as much as possible, which confirm the results obtained
within. But even if such results are non-conformant, this does not mean that the information about state financial behavior is useless or unimportant. U.S. states are, in many
ways, totally unique political entities: they have a complicated history of sovereignty under
the national government; despite the fact that they can totally dominate and control local
governments, they take dramatically different approaches to doing so; and politically, they
are essentially structured as miniature countries, but they all exist within a common legal
and economic framework. All of this is to say that state-level research can be extremely
8

valuable, for its own sake. In another common trope learned by students of public finance
and public policy more generally, this one arguably more true than the last, states provide
a valuable laboratory for studying the effects of public sector behavior.

1.3 Description and Outline of the Dissertation

As introduced above, the purpose of this dissertation is to respond to ongoing issues in the
existing literature regarding the role of revenue diversification in the public financial sector.
The original research objective that led to this endeavor was to expand the consideration of
revenue diversification to the study of public debt. Attempting to make progress along such
lines, however, it quickly became apparent that there were still a great number of unresolved
empirical and methodological questions regarding the relationship between revenue diversification and revenues, themselves. Specific questions regarding this relationship form the
basis for the following chapters.
Operating largely among two separate and competing (and at least sometimes successful) hypotheses, the extant literature has continued to evade a definitive answer about the
causes and effects of the phenomenon of revenue diversification. The principal argument
of the dissertation is that this ongoing uncertainty may, in part, be due to various theoretical and empirical issues with the way that revenue diversification has been studied in
the past. The theoretical division has already been established. Empirical concerns have
been present since the earliest days, when scholars were studying the revenue-complexity
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hypothesis at the advent of public choice, and strides have certainly been made since then
in employing more rigorous methodology to the endeavor. However, there are many issues
(even ones that have been previously raised, but subsequently under-addressed) that have
still not been fully embraced within the literature, and this reality may contribute to the
lingering debate that exists.
In general, this dissertation aims to achieve progress along these lines, and offer directions for general improvement in the study of revenue diversification, in whatever form it
may take. Specifically, it addresses three particularly pressing concerns that flow out of the
extant literature, which form the overarching themes of the three substantive chapters that
follow:

1. The non-uniformity in the way that revenue diversification has traditionally been
measured;
2. The under-developed concern over issues of endogeneity between the principal variables in either of the two dominant camps in the literature; and
3. The lack of consideration for a broader and more nuanced treatment of revenue diversification, outside of simple measures of concentration.

These three concerns can and do stand on their own, but as will be quickly be seen they
are also intimately interrelated and constantly refer to one another. In any given context,
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the ability to improve upon one or another will certainly be limited (another reason that this
dissertation focuses on the states, which provide detailed enough data to improve upon all
three fronts), but greater attention to any one would serve to advance the discussion of the
role of revenue diversification in the public financial system.
With that, an overview of the remaining chapters follows, to illustrate the structure of
this research. Each chapter serves a particular function, and is written as a standalone
piece of research which can be read and understood on its own. As such, there is a fair
deal of repetition, especially regarding the literature. Additionally, each chapter serves to
address one particular empirical advance at a time, and does not necessarily build directly
upon one the others (although there is substantial empirical overlap between Chapters 3 and
4). Ultimately, the hope is that all of these advancements will be incorporated into future
literature, and a single study that considers all of the issues raised, and simultaneously
addresses them, will be possible. Currently, however, progress must be made one step at a
time in order to maintain any level of comparability between the results of these chapters
and previous studies in the literature. Despite this, the reader of the dissertation as a whole
is implored to keep in mind the overarching objective as elaborated above, which is to
provide a systematic assessment and critique of the way that revenue diversification has
been studied in past panel data settings and offer an array of general improvements to this
endeavor.
Chapter 2 addresses issues in the measurement of revenue diversification. The longstanding norm is to employ some formulation of a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of con11

centration (HHI), adopted from the industrial organization literature dealing with firm concentration in industrial markets. However, the specific formulation of this index has been
far from standardized. Early studies include only the most major tax categories, relegating all other revenue sources to the category “other.” In the more recent literature, the
disaggregation of tax categories is sometimes great, and sometimes not. This level of aggregation alone is shown to substantially impact the comparative measures of revenue diversification among the states. When expanded to the consideration of alternative revenue
sources outside of taxation, such as user fees and charges (fairly common), and intergovernmental revenue and debt (much less common), the measurement becomes particularly
unstable compared to more basic formulations. Whether or not these additional categories
should be included remains a matter of debate, as is discussed in the chapter, but one
which the existent literature rarely explicitly considers. Additionally, the issue of visibility (or salience) is introduced, as is a new but currently virtually unused alternative to the
Herfindahl-Hirshman Index entirely.
Chapter 3 explicitly tackles the existent debate in the literature between the revenuecomplexity hypothesis and the revenue volatility argument. Rather than treating each of
these explanations as fundamentally opposed to one another, as they are often presented,
a unified theoretical model is developed which incorporates both hypotheses as part of a
single conceptual system. Additionally, rather than empirically testing the two hypotheses
in isolation of one another and with different empirical specifications, a unified empirical
strategy is also established. Aside from the theoretical motivations for doing so, the esti12

mation strategy largely results from an under-considered element in the empirical literature
on both sides: the possibility of endogeneity between dependent and explanatory variables.
Although more recent literature has made strides in addressing this issue from, concerns
remain and are often discussed to but a small extent. The public financial system is inherently interconnected, and deriving a convincing estimation strategy is extremely difficult.
In response to this reality, an alternative empirical method is employed: Granger causality
estimation. Employing lagged variables for the key explanatory variables, Arellano-Bond
GMM estimators are obtained to simultaneously test the relationship between revenue diversification and both government size (from the revenue-complexity hypothesis) and revenue volatility (from the revenue volatility argument). The results offer Granger causal
evidence for each of the two hypotheses in the literature, although the directions of the
results raise significant questions about key elements of the hypotheses on which the bulk
of our current knowledge relies.
Chapter 4 responds to issues raised by both of the previous two chapters. The results of
this chapter make clear that additional attention to the relationship between revenue diversification and revenue volatility is particularly warranted, because the expected direction of
the relationships between the two variables is unstable and ultimately not confirmed. Results from Chapters 2 and 3 offer some insight as to why this might be the case – namely,
that the ubiquitous HHI is fundamentally limited in its ability to fully capture all aspects
of revenue diversity. The makeup of the overall revenue structure between states is diverse
in many ways, beyond a simple measure of concentration. This chapter operates under the
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hypothesis that it is not just the overall mix of revenue mechanisms (in percentage terms)
that determines the effect of that mix, but rather its actual composition; State A and State
B may be perfectly equal in the measure of revenue diversification, but if State A relies
primarily on the income tax, while State B relies primarily on the sales tax, the impact
of each state’s particular blend of diversification may be very different, particularly when
considering revenue volatility and if different mechanisms have their own inherent level
of volatility (as is demonstrated). The empirical analysis modifies the methodology of the
previous chapter to explicitly include each different tax mechanisms as qualitatively different entities, rather than just relying on each mechanism’s percentage contribution to a
measure of diversification, such as the HHI.
Chapter 5 offers a summary and general discussion of the diverse, but related, results
obtained in the previous chapters of the dissertation. This includes a critical analysis of
remaining theoretical and empirical issues, and suggestions for future development of the
ideas contained within. The objective here is not to provide the definitive evidence about
the role of revenue diversification; as the state of the current literature suggests, this is a
complicated question that has and will continue to require continued scholarly attention.
Rather, the objective is to provide nonetheless useful evidence which inspires new directions and considerations in the ongoing empirical study of this phenomenon. The chapter
also includes comments on the policy implications of these findings and this field of study
as a whole. The public revenue landscape has certainly been changing substantially at the
sub-national level. We will be well served to better understand its motivations and its ef14

fects in order to make strong recommendations to policymakers about future adjustments
to the revenue structure that they may consider.
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Chapter Two: Measuring Revenue Diversity
2.1 Introduction

There is a very well-developed literature in public finance and public financial management
regarding the practice and role of revenue diversity, or the extent to which a government
relies on many and varied different individual revenue streams, rather than a heavy reliance
on one or a small number of revenue mechanisms.4 In particular, there are two major
threads in the literature which conceptualize diversity in contrasting ways. One of these
threads, from the political economy tradition in public economics, views diversification as
a tool for opportunistic policymakers to artificially expand public expenditures beyond the
socially optimal level. The rationale is that the increasingly complicated revenue structure
is difficult for citizens to keep track of and fully conceptualize, and they are thus willing
to accept both a higher overall tax burden and higher public spending (an idea known
as the revenue-complexity hypothesis of fiscal illusion).5 A more recent thread, in the
financial management literature, views diversification as a response to and solution for
increasing revenue volatility; relying on a greater number of revenue mechanisms in more
equal measure is an attempt to stabilize the total revenue stream. There is a rich tradition
4A

note on terminology: revenue diversity and revenue diversification are generally used synonymously,
however they technically refer to different concepts. Diversity is a state at a given point in time, whereas
diversification is a dynamic process of increasing the level of diversity. This paper makes an effort to use
each term with precision. I am indebted to Christopher Goodman of the University of Nebraska-Omaha for
pointing out this distinction in his forthcoming paper on the matter, which is discussed in greater detail below.
5 An additional note on terminology: this thread of the literature typically refers to revenue complexity
rather than revenue diversity, but the concept and operationalization are the same. In this paper, I default to
the use of diversity because it is less charged with a negative connotation, but occasionally use complexity
when referring explicitly to the fiscal illusion literature.
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of empirical results finding support for one of the two hypotheses, usually at the expense of
the other. However, there is little consistency in the way that revenue diversity is actually
measured, and it is quite possible that this variation may drive some of the contrasting
results in the literature which have so far been observed.
The purpose of this essay is threefold: first, to carefully examine trends in revenue diversification among the U.S. states over the past few decades, the same period when most
of this scholarly work has been taking place; second, to critically assess the measurement
of revenue diversity, both as traditionally applied and according to theoretical insights from
the literature; and third, to demonstrate, using a common dataset of all U.S. states from
1977-2012, how the measurement of diversity can vary substantially, based on the particular methods employed. Several issues and complications in the measurement of revenue
diversity are raised within, and it will become apparent that most of these issues are not
new, but have already been posed within the literature – in some cases decades ago. However, the recent literature has still coalesced around one particular method of measuring
diversity (the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index), which itself is subject to inconsistency based
on very particular choices about the manner in which it is specified. Thus, before larger
theoretical issues in the study of revenue diversity can be disentangled, it is important to
give the issue of measurement a careful treatment.
In section two below, the historical threads in the literature, mentioned above, are discussed in greater detail. Section three illustrates general trends in revenue diversification
at the state level, and presents some graphical evidence about this phenomenon. Section
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four addresses variations in diversity measurement, both as applied in the literature as well
as theoretically proposed amendments. Section five presents a demonstration of the variation in measurement that can occur, dependent on the specification employed. Finally,
section six concludes and discusses the implications of this exercise as well as directions
for advancements in the literature, which will be the subject of future work.

2.2 Revenue Diversity vs. Revenue Complexity: A Tale of Two Literatures

As intimated in the introduction above, there are two major threads in the public finance
literature that are heavily tied to revenue diversity. These two threads have developed
with reference to one another, but are also generally presented as two completely separate
approaches to a single phenomenon. Whether this separation is theoretically valid is debatable, but for the purpose of discussing the employment of diversity measures as they
have actually developed, the literatures are presented separately, as they are traditionally
treated.6 Although the theoretical underpinnings and complexities of the different threads
are not directly relevant to the practical concerns of diversity measurement presented here,
these are the settings in which diversity measures have been applied, and inconsistencies in
that application is the motivation for this current paper. As such, it is appropriate to offer
6 A companion piece to this one, building off some of this early literature at the time of the disconnect, con-

tends that the separation is not, indeed, valid. However, that argument is quite separate from the measurement
issue that is of focus here.
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at least a general overview of the literatures as they stand.

2.2.1 Fiscal Illusion and the Revenue Complexity Hypothesis
The original concern over the role of revenue diversity – or in this particular theoretical
construct, revenue complexity – was developed in the context of fiscal illusion. This is,
generally, the idea that for some reason, citizens underestimate their total tax burden and
are thus willing to accept a higher level of expenditures than they otherwise would, because
the tax-price of those expenditures is misconstrued. There are various different proposed
mechanisms as to why this might occur, but one of the principal mechanisms is widely
referred to as the revenue complexity hypothesis.7 This specific hypothesis proposes that
increased revenue complexity results in fiscal illusion because citizens split their tax burden
between a greater number of mechanisms and thus never fully aggregate the total amount
paid. As such, they underestimate the cost of public goods and services, and demand a
higher amount than they otherwise would. Policymakers, in this theoretical framework,
are opportunists and budget-maximizers, who exploit this form of illusion to expand public
spending in targeted ways, so as to maximize their own chances of reelection.
This literature has its earliest roots over a century ago in the work of Puviani (1903)8 ,
rediscovered and brought to the forefront in the mid-twentieth century during the advent
7 For

a comprehensive overview of these various mechanisms, including not only the revenue complexity
hypothesis but also revenue elasticity illusion, renter illusion, debt illusion, and the flypaper effect, see Dollery
and Worthington, 1996.
8 An English translation of Puviani’s work has never become reality. Accordingly, modern knowledge of
his works comes mostly from those scholars discussed above who rediscovered and popularized his ideas,
with a debt to the work of Fasiani (1951).
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of the public choice tradition (the forerunner of political economy) in public economics
(chiefly by Buchanan, 1967). Wagner (1976) offers the earliest widely cited empirical
study of the phenomenon, using local government data from the fifty largest cities in the
United States and finding strong evidence for the revenue complexity hypothesis – that
is, a more diversified overall revenue structure was associated with higher public expenditures, controlling for other economic demand-side factors. This study has spawned an
extremely active empirical literature, yielding mixed results. A number of studies have
corroborated the positive spending effects found by Wagner, using some formulation of
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure revenue complexity (Baker, 1983; Heyndels
and Smolders, 1994) or alternative measures, such as simply the number of revenue instruments utilized (Breeden and Hunter, 1985). Additional evidence has been provided for the
revenue-complexity hypothesis by directly studying citizens’ perceptions through survey
methods, and finding that their perceptions of their total tax burdens are significantly more
reduced in more diversified settings (Cullis and Jones, 1987; Sanandaji and Wallace, 2011).
Despite this plethora of empirical evidence in support of the revenue complexity hypothesis, there have also been a number of studies finding contrasting results. An early
example of one such study, anticipating many of the measurement issues discussed below,
can be found in Munley and Greene (1978), which replicated Wagner’s seminal study and
yielded insignificant results after controlling for heterogeneity, measuring variables in per
capita terms, and increasing the number of revenue categories from four to nine (see also
Schokkaert, 1987). The bulk of the empirical evidence against the revenue complexity hy20

pothesis comes from the fiscal stabilization literature discussed below, however, so I ask
the reader to temporarily defer his or her curiosity about additional negative results.
During this period of mixed results, there has been one major modification to the measurement of revenue diversity that is commonly associated with a return to positive results
and support for the revenue complexity hypothesis: the consideration of visibility. The
concept of revenue visibility, which is also discussed in some detail below in the section
on proposed modifications to classic measures of diversity, refers to the idea that not all
taxes are equally visible to the citizen. As such, if one is trying to study revenue diversity in relation to citizen tolerance for expenditures, it is the perceived tax burden that is
important. Diversification itself may serve to reduce the perceived tax burden (as was the
original hypothesis), but within a diversified structure, the relative reliance on more or less
visible taxes will also play an important role in the citizen’s final perception of his or her
overall level of taxation. I leave a more detailed discussion of the rationale for and methods
of incorporating visibility concerns to the dedicated section below. But for reference, there
are number of studies that have found positive fiscal illusion results by incorporating this
concept in some fashion (Pommerehne and Schneider, 1978; Breeden and Hunter, 1985;
Nelson, 1986; Gemmell, Morrissey and Pinar, 1999; Sausgruber and Tyran, 2005).
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2.2.2 Fiscal Stabilization, Revenue Diversification, and Revenue Volatility
In response to the inconsistent results in the fiscal illusion literature, alternate explanations
for and uses of revenue diversification began to be considered. Chiefly, revenue diversification grew to be seen as an answer to and potential solution for revenue volatility, or
the instability of revenue streams from year to year.9 The rationale behind this claim is
that a government relying overwhelmingly on one individual tax mechanism is particularly
susceptible to economic forces that affect that particular base. For example, a very heavy
reliance on the individual income tax will result in a revenue structure that is particularly
sensitive to changes in the business cycle which affect employment. Diversifying revenue
streams serves to minimize volatility by relying on multiple tax bases that are differentially
affected by economic forces. The original idea of diversification for the sake of revenue
stabilization arose as a competing hypothesis for the revenue complexity hypothesis and a
possible explanation for insignificant results in that literature (Oates, 1988, Misiolek and
Elder, 1988).
Since that time, the stabilization literature has taken on a life of its own and found generally negative and stastisically significant relationships between the amount of diversity
and revenue volatility. Misiolek and Elder (1988) provide the first empirical evidence of
this relationship, while at the same time finding no evidence for the revenue complexity hypothesis. A pair of widely cited studies in the financial management literature took up this
9 Although

not crucial to this study, it is worth noting that there is a substantial feedback loop involved
in this relationship; volatility is symptom of an undiversified revenue structure, which results in revenue
diversification in order to reduce volatility.
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idea, finding additional empirical evidence for diversification as a tool for revenue stabilization, and separately testing (but finding no evidence for) the fiscal illusion relationship.
Hendrick (2002) studies municipalities in the Chicago metropolitan area, measuring diversity as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with four categories (property tax, sales tax, other
tax, and non-tax revenue). Carroll (2009) studies a panel of municipal governments in the
U.S. with a population over 25,000 from 1970-2002, also using four categories (property
tax, sales tax, income tax, and other tax) to measure diversity in the test for revenue stabilization, but utilizing count variables of the number of tax and non-tax revenues in the
test for fiscal illusion.10 Other studies have moved forward with the idea of a strong relationship between revenue diversity and stabilization, without comparison to the revenue
complexity hypothesis (e.g. Carroll, Eger, and Marlowe, 2003; Carroll and Johnson, 2010).
In general, the evidence for using revenue diversification as a tool for reducing revenue volatility and promoting stabilization is much more consistent than the evidence for
diversification as a tool to promote fiscal illusion, which has been consistently mixed over
the past few decades. However, the treatment of the two threads as mutually exclusive
and competing hypotheses has not been given sufficient conceptual treatment, and this may
also be driving some of the confusion. Regardless, this is another application in which
the measurement of revenue diversity is key, and it illustrates the importance of diversity
measurement in areas beyond the original application in the fiscal illusion literature.
10 It is not clear why diversity is measured differently between the two hypotheses, since the earliest illusion

literature (e.g. Wagner, 1976) has generally used some form of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as well.
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2.3 Revenue Diversity in the States – Trends from 1977-2012
2.3.1 Why States?
The U.S. states offer a unique opportunity to study revenue diversity trends, particularly in
this context of considering alternate diversity measures, because consistent data across both
time and space is readily available. Many previous studies including diversity as a key variable have been conducted at the local level, which is often conceptually appealing because
local governments, particularly in urban/suburban metropolises, are extremely variable and
more directly controlled by citizen preferences. However, this offers some severe challenges in terms of data availability. For one thing, limited local financial data often restricts
such studies to cross-sectional analysis rather than panel data analysis, which is a powerful
improvement in empirical terms if the data can be obtained. Additionally, limited local data
often dictates on its own how precisely diversity is measured, since revenue categories are
limited and can vary widely across the localities. This predetermined nature of the measure
limits the ability for results to be tested for sensitivity to alternate diversity specifications.
Raising the level of analysis to the states allows for a great deal more exploration of the
measurement issue.
Analysis at the state level is also worthy of study on its own merits, because the states
exhibit a great deal of variation in their overall revenue diversity and reliance on different
revenue mechanisms, both across the states and over time. There are several notable cases
of states making particularly individualistic choices. These include: the nine states with-
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out an individual income tax11 (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming), the five states without a sales tax (Alaska,
Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon), the six states which collect an appreciable amount of revenue from property tax, which is usually reserved for local governments
(Arkansas, Montana, New Hampshire, Vermont, Washington, Wyoming), and the only state
to collect the majority of its revenue through the corporate income tax (Alaska).
State-level data is taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Census of State and Local Government Finance.12 This source provides highly categorized data on state revenues, expenditures, and debt. Revenue categories are defined by the Census Bureau and standardized
across the states, even though state-by-state reporting may be different. As will be seen in
the Section 4, using this data allows standard diversity measurements to be readily adjusted
and modified. Before doing this, however, simple illustrations and measurements will be
presented in order to demonstrate the substantial variation in state revenue behavior.

2.3.2 Revenue Diversity Trends in the States
As this paper will demonstrate, there are many nuanced questions to ask regarding how
to most appropriately assess and measure revenue diversity. However, for the sake of preliminary illustration, a basic operationalization will be adopted in order to demonstrate
11 These

states have no income tax on earned income – the most commonly conceptualized version of an
income tax. New Hampshire and Tennessee do, however, impose a low rate of income tax on dividends and
interest.
12 The Census of State and Local Government Finance is conducted annually for state governments. For
local governments, it is collected, in full, every five years (those years ending in 2 or 7) and updated annually
using sampling techniques.
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that substantial variation both between states and within individual states over time, when
it comes to reliance on different revenue mechanisms. This illustration uses six different
revenue categories. Because they are so commonly utilized throughout the literature, the
first four are the most prominent categories of general taxation: sales, property, individual
income, and corporate income. Also included is the motor fuels tax, which is often one of
the only other single revenue categories that competes with the general tax categories in
terms of prominence at the state level. Finally, there is an “other” tax category to capture
all smaller tax streams. Such an operationalization splits the difference between traditional
measures (focusing only on the “main four” tax categories, if at all) and more inclusive
measures which incorporate important earmarked taxes and user fees, proxied here by the
motor fuels tax.
To get an initial sense of general revenue patterns at the state level, Figure 1 displays
average state-level reliance on the included tax mechanisms in both 1977 and 2012. Although not much can be divined at this national level of aggregation, since most shares
retain their relative prominence in state finance, there is one important trend that can be observed: the reliance on the individual income tax has grown substantially, to the detriment
of all other tax mechanisms except for the sales tax. This income tax trend is quite prevalent in state finance, although it is interesting to observe that (on average) it does not seem
to have come at the expense of reliance on the sales tax, which is the traditional provenance
of state government finance.
A far greater amount of variance can be observed by considering the individual states.
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Figure 1: State Tax Revenue by Mechanism - U.S. Average

Figure 2 displays the same tax categories as above, by state, in 2012 – the most recent year
for which data is available. Excluding the states noted above that do not have a sales tax,
this tax mechanism generally remains a major revenue source at the state level (especially
for those states without an individual income tax). This is in accordance with the traditional
conception of multilevel public finance in the United States, which holds the sales tax as
the preferred mechanism of state government tax collection. Among those states that allow
the individual income tax, there is an extremely large amount of variation in how much the
states rely on it, from Oregon at nearly 75% to Vermont at less than 25%. More relevant
here, in a paper considering revenue diversity, there are some states that rely overwhelmingly on one particular tax mechanism, which represents a noted lack of diversity, and many
states that come closer to balance. None of the states, however, seem to display an actual
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Figure 2: State Tax Revenue by Mechanism - 2012

attempt at equal-share diversity (at least along these categories). Furthermore, it should
be noted that none of the categories, except for the motor fuels tax – the only use-specific
category included – display anything close to consistency across the states; between-state
heterogeneity is quite strong.
Despite this demonstration of static differences between the states in terms of revenue
diversity, the aforementioned benefits of panel data make clear that dynamic differences are
equally important to consider. Thus, Figures 3 and 4 illustrate trends in revenue mechanism
reliance over time for the full period available in the data. As will be noted, a large number
of states don’t display much variation in their reliance on different tax mechanisms over
these years. Many even display an increasing reliance on particular revenue mechanisms
(and thus, decreasing revenue diversity). Indeed, an eyeball test of the data suggests that
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Figure 3: State Tax Revenue by Mechanism - 1977-2012

only five of the fifty states clearly demonstrate a trend toward revenue diversification during this period: Indiana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Vermont, and West Virginia.13 The
rest of this paper serves to justify the idea that not much stock should be placed in this
particular graphical assessment, however, because the number of categories included and
their relative weights are important. In section five, overall assessments can be considered
more carefully, using various numerical calculations. However, if one is temporarily willing to accept this simplified revenue category structure as illustrative, it is clear that there is
a lot of within-state heterogeneity to make use of as well, incorporating all possible trends:
increasing, decreasing, and stable in revenue diversity over time.
13 Alaska

must be mentioned as a particularly curious case, displaying more volatility in revenue categories
than any other state, by far. This is the result of Alaska’s heavy reliance on the corporate income tax, which
in turn is the manifestation of a heavy reliance on natural resource (i.e. oil) taxation. Since this revenue
stream is particularly susceptible to market fluctuations, revenue shares (defined as percentages of the whole,
regardless of what that whole actually is) are particularly volatile as well.
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Figure 4: State Tax Revenue by Mechanism - 1977-2012 (cont.)

2.4 Measuring Revenue Diversity

The objective of any measure of revenue diversity is to somehow assess the number of revenue instruments utilized and the relative reliance on those instruments. In general terms, a
highly diversified revenue system will rely on a large number of revenue mechanisms (e.g.
personal income tax, sales tax, corporate income tax, property tax, special taxes, user fees,
etc.) and rely on no one particular mechanism to a particularly large degree. In contrast,
a highly concentrated revenue system will rely extremely heavily on one or two tax mechanisms only. Diversity has been measured in different ways throughout the history of the
literature, but it has largely coalesced around a particular formulation of the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI). Given the predominance of this measure, it is discussed in some
detail below, before addressing relevant alterations and alternatives.
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2.4.1 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
2.4.1.1 Basic Forumulations
In its earliest formulation, the HHI was calculated by the extremely straightforward formula
given in equation (1) below:

HHIOriginal = ∑r2j

(1)

j

The index is the sum of the squared percentages, r, of each of j revenue categories.
The squaring of the percentages gives additional weight to the most dominant revenue
categories, which is consistent with early assumptions in the fiscal illusion literature that
citizens only pay attention to the largest and most prevalent mechanisms, as espoused in
Wagner (1976), which is also the study that first introduced the use of the HHI in public
revenue investigations. According to this formulation, perfect concentration (all revenue
coming from a single source) would result in a value of 1.0, while perfect diversity would
result in a smaller value, the limit of which is determined by the number of revenue categories considered (e.g. 0.5 for two categories, 0.33 for three, 0.25 for four, etc.). This
formulation was brought to the forefront by Stigler (1968) in his book on market concentration, which is same literature (the economics subfield of industrial organization) in
which the measure has become most well-known in the social sciences. It has since been
used utilized in several major studies in the field of revenue diversity (e.g. Misiolek and
Elder, 1988; Suyderhoud, 1994).
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In more recent studies, a slight variation on the HHI has become prevalent, which modifies the same basic idea, but scales it by the number of revenue categories included, for
a more comprehensive measure that captures information about both the number of categories and their relative dominance.14 This formulation is given by equation (2) below:

1 − ∑r2j
HHIModi f ied =

j

1 − 1j

(2)

This formulation makes two changes to the interpretation of the HHI measure. First,
by subtracting the summed revenue percentages from one, the direction of interpretation is
changed: a value of 1.0 represents perfect diversification, instead of perfect concentration.
Second, scaling by the number of categories also removes the variability of the lower limit,
meaning that 0 serves as the limit for perfect concentration, regardless of the number of
categories included. This formulation has been widely employed in many of the more
recent studies utilizing revenue diversity as a key variable (e.g. Hendrick, 2002; Carroll,
2009; Carroll and Johnson, 2010). It has become the standard calculation of the HHI in
this and other literatures, whenever a concentration index is required. Moving forward, this
will be assumed as the default formulation of the index, upon which any modifications will
be based.

14 One

can find minor variations on this general formula in the literature, but this particular formulation is
by far the dominant variant in the recent revenue diversity studies.
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2.4.1.2 Revenue Categories
The most immediate issue that arises when comparing studies utilizing HHI measures of
revenue diversity is that the number and definition of the revenue categories included, j in
both formulations above, can vary substantially. Early studies tended to include only the
most classic forms of own-source tax revenue: the sales tax (the traditional provenance of
state-level revenue), the individual income tax (increasingly prominent over the past several decades), the corporate income tax (varyingly relevant, depending on the state), and the
property tax (generally a minor source of state revenue, reserved instead for local governments). As demonstrated in the graphs and figures above, these four major categories (with
the addition of the motor fuels tax, a consistently major category) do represent a large and
substantial amount of variation between the states and within the states over time. However, the “other tax” category remains a major source of revenue in most cases, and how
extensively to disaggregate it has been a subject of varied practice, but little explicit consideration.
The level of disaggregation of the “other tax” category does have the potential to change
the measurement of the HHI, although this potential also reaches a limit. Once categories
have already been disaggregated substantially, and the most sizable individual categories
are individually included, the added benefit of additional disaggregation can become quite
small. This occurs because many of these individual (one might think of them as miscellaneous) tax categories provide an extremely small share of total revenue. Referring again to
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equation (2), disaggregating into one additional category means two smaller values for r,
which become even smaller once squared, and a slightly larger j, which after enough categories are included simply serves to make a small fraction slightly smaller. As such, there
would conceptually seem to be a point at which further disaggregation, from a practical
perspective, becomes unimportant for generating substantially different measurements of
diversity. However, if the “other” category houses sub-categories that still retain substantial
variation between the observations, additional disaggregation can indeed unearth valuable
information.
A more significant and potentially more problematic issue, however, is how to consider
not just tax revenue, as commonly conceptualized, but other streams of revenue outside
the traditional tax system. One immediately recognizable source of such revenue, which
doesn’t pose much of a theoretical challenge, is the reliance on user fees and other nontax streams of own-source revenue.15 These revenue categories, like taxes, have their own
individual and current bases, comprised of different segments of the population. The complication that can arise is that certain user fees (or particular taxes) generate revenue that is
earmarked for particularly spending categories, such as the motor fuels tax and transportation expenditures, as opposed to the broad tax categories which generate general revenue.
However, it is unclear why, from a citizen’s point of view, why expenditure earmarking
would change their perception of the diversity of the taxes they pay. Additionally, given
15 Indeed,

the distinction between a tax and a fee is often extremely muddled, and may devolve into nothing
more than an issue of linguistic labelling, rather than any substantive difference. Given the generally negative
connotation of the word “tax,” it is not uncommon for something that looks and behaves like a tax in every
way to masquerade as a “fee” or a “charge” instead.
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the fungibility of public funds, it is likely that even earmarked funds contribute to the same
trends of concern when studying revenue diversity (i.e. increased general expenditures and
overall revenue volatility). Whether or not these categories are included varies within the
literature, but they are often not; some notable studies explicitly refer to tax diversity (or
tax complexity) rather than revenue diversity (Heyndels and Smolders, 1995; Dollery and
Worthington, 1999), while others refer to revenue diversity but still make use of only the
traditional tax categories (e.g. Carroll, 2009).
There are two particular categories of revenue, however, that are much more complicated in this regard: intergovernmental revenue and debt. In the literature, these categories
are generally excluded from diversity measures, so the following discussion is entirely
theoretical. Intergovernmental revenue is non own-source revenue that primarily refers to
grants and transfers from higher level governments. There is often a strong rationale for
excluding intergovernmental revenue from diversity measures, because this a not a choice
made by the level of government in question (here, states). However, a case can be made
for including such revenues, depending on the theoretical and causal story being told. In
models where revenue diversity is employed as a choice variable, such as the classic fiscal
illusion model, or when diversification is used as an active strategy for reducing volatility,
it would be illogical to include intergovernmental revenue as a category in the diversity
measure. However, if diversity is being employed as an exogenous explanatory variable, as
it sometimes is, then the rationale for excluding intergovernmental revenue, often a major
source of subnational government revenues, is not as clear.
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Debt is a complicated consideration for a different reason. Unlike intergovernmental
revenue, the amount of debt issued is clearly a choice variable for the government in question. However, it is not an independent revenue stream in a traditional sense. Debt issued
is not an alternative to traditional revenue mechanisms, because it must be repaid in the
future, using those same revenue streams. Denison and Greer (2014) make this argument,
stating that debt is not a revenue source on its own, but a fiscal obligation. However, thinking in terms of inter-temporal economic modeling, this argument may be subject to some
debate. The tax base for particular tax mechanisms may not change in definition over time,
but the individuals who contribute to that tax base do change. One can think of the individual income tax, where individuals enter and exit the workforce throughout the life-cycle,
including various transitional phases. In a more morbid but ultimately more substantial
way, individuals die and cease all tax liability. In this sense, current vs. future tax bases
actually are different entities, and treating debt as an alternate revenue mechanism is, at
the very least, arguable, depending on the application of the measurement. The same issue arises here that was addressed above regarding earmarked taxes, since states generally
have balanced budget requirements and restrictions against using debt for current operating
expenditures, essentially earmarking debt revenue for capital expenditures. However, the
same solutions can also be proffered, suggesting that this discussion is not as settled as the
the current literature might present.
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2.4.1.3 Visibility Weightings
An idea for modification of the diversity measure that arose quite early in the literature
(e.g. Pommerehne and Schneider, 1978), but has inexplicably been neglected in many
studies since, is the idea of weighting different revenue mechanisms according to their
variable relevance to citizens’ lives, or visibility. For example, the individual income tax
is reconciled in full once per year, and citizens are faced with the exact dollar amount
paid in said tax whether they like it or not; this tax would thus be considered to be highly
visible. In contrast, the sales tax is paid in tiny increments on every purchase made on a
daily basis, and is never annually aggregated by any but the most fastidious (or perhaps
obsessive) individuals; this tax would thus be considered to be much less visible. This
concept actually has extremely early roots with Mill (1848) and his discussion of direct
versus indirect taxation, with indirect taxation being under-valued by the taxpayers.
Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) achieve their weighting scheme by grouping the
two most visible tax categories – income tax and wealth tax (this analysis used European
data) – together, which gives additional weight to these more visible mechanisms in the
HHI, due to the squaring process. It is expected that this alternate calculation would provide stronger evidence for fiscal illusion than a more disaggregated scheme, which they in
fact observe. Misiolek and Elder (1988), do not modify the actual measurement of diversity, but they do include an additional variable in order to capture visibility concerns. They
employ a standard HHI to capture complexity, but run this variable alongside a “visible
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tax concentration ratio” which assesses the proportion of tax revenue derived from visible
taxes (in their estimation: personal income, sales, and property taxes). Other studies follow
a similar approach (Baker, 1983; Breeden and Hunter, 1985). Incorporating some measurement of visibility has, in the more recent literature, been one of the more consistent
predictors of significant fiscal illusion findings.
Although the idea of incorporating visibility has been intermittent in the fiscal illusion
literature (and essentially absent in the stabilization literature), the idea has arisen in a
different form in the public economics literature in recent years, usually under the heading
of tax salience. In economics, salience is an empirical question – whether or not some
modification has an observable behavioral effect. The modification in question here is the
visibility of particular taxes; studies seek to estimate the consumption effects of making
taxes more or less visible to the consumers. Given this consumer orientation, most studies
have focused on consumption taxes such as the sales tax or particular user fees. In one
of the recent hallmarks of this literature, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) offer quasiexperimental evidence that the average consumer reacts notably (reducing purchases by
about 8 percent) when sales tax is clearly depicted on price tags, as opposed to simply
being presented with gross of tax prices in the aisle and the incremental adjustment being
made at the counter. This suggests that sales tax, at least, is particularly sensitive to issues
of visibility whether consumers are made explicitly aware of the sales tax burden affects
their behavior in a noticeable way. In another example of such work, Finkelstein (2009)
analyzes electronic highway tolling, compared with traditional tolling in which a driver has
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to stop and physically pay the toll on the road, and finds that the reduced salience of the
electronically collected tax results in inflated tax rates.
Such studies, focused on the modification of one particular tax mechanism, are not
directly relevant to the measurement of revenue diversity, a concept which considers the
totality of public revenues collected. However, their strong positive results and growing
popularity underlines the relevance and importance of visibility in the cognitive processes
of consumers/citizens.16 This literature offers additional support to the idea that an agnostic
conception of revenue diversity, treating each revenue category as qualitatively identical
and only considering the number and share of each category, is potentially problematic.

2.4.2 The Ecological Approach
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is unlikely to be replaced as the standard method for
measuring revenue diversity any time soon, for multiple reasons. It is relatively easily constructed, it has become the dominant standard in the literature (both fiscal illusion, measuring complexity, and fiscal stabilization, measuring diversity), and is more broadly known
in economics and other social sciences due its well-established use in the field of industrial
organization to measure market concentration. However, it is worth noting that alternatives
to the HHI do exist, and one such alternative is currently being proposed for application
16 With

the definitional focus on citizen perception and behavior, the visibility issue may be of limited
concern to the stabilization literature, which connects diversity to revenue volatility and takes place entirely
at the governmental level. That’s not to say there is no relevance, however, as diversification that ends
up increasing the reliance on highly visible revenue mechanisms may result in a behavioral response and
depressed revenues. Regardless, the relevance for the fiscal illusion applications of diversity measurement is
quite clear.
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to revenue diversity. Goodman (2015) introduces a new (again) index of diversity, adapted
from the ecology literature (originally Hill, 1973; more recently Tuomisto, 2010) regarding
species diversity. This measure (or a variant of it) had previously been employed with public revenues in a pair of studies (Heyndels and Smolders, 1995; Dollery and Worthington,
1999) but never gained much traction, with subsequent studies returning to the use of the
HHI. The formula is presented in equation (3) below:
√
R
1
q−1
q
D = q = 1/
)
∑ (pi pq−1
i
p̄i
i=1

(3)

This measure conceptualizes diversity as one over the weighted generalized mean of the
different revenue streams included (q p̄i ). The weighted generalized mean is each revenue
percentage (pi ) raised to the exponent q − 1, weighted by the proportion of the revenue
source (pi itself). The parameter q is a choice, representing the type of mean utilized:
q = 0 results in a harmonic mean, q = 1 results in a geometric mean, q = 2 results in an
arithmetic mean. These choices in mean definition offer alternate weights to dominant
revenue categories. A larger value of q gives greater weight to larger categories, while a
smaller value of q gives greater weight to smaller categories.17 Regardless of the type of
mean chosen the measure captures, in the ecological terminology, both the “richness” of
diversity (how many different sources are present) and the “evenness” of diversity (how
equitably the different sources are represented). And the major benefit comes from the
17 There

are no apparent guidelines for making this determination, meaning that utilizing this measure
results in one more choice which must be justified in some way. This presents yet another impediment for
adoption against the dominant Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
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measure’s interpretation; rather than the extremely abstract interpretation of the HHI, a 0-1
scale from perfect concentration to perfect diversification, coefficients from this measure
are instead interpreted as the effect of introducing one entirely new revenue source to the
mix.
This alternate formulation is not necessarily presented as a present solution to the measurement issue, because it is so uncommon in the literature and imposes its own new challenges. However, it is well worth recognizing that the measurement of revenue diversity is
not necessarily beholden to some formulation of the HHI. In addition to the modifications
discussed above, there are entirely different strategies for measuring diversity which have
been employed in the past and are currently generating renewed interest. What effects a
completely new measurement scheme would have on empirical results in the fiscal illusion
or stabilization literatures remains unknown, but may be an interesting avenue for future
research.

2.5 The Impact of Measurement Choices

The purpose of this section is to illustrate the actual impact of many of the variable choices
in measuring diversity discussed above. If the measurement choices made were unimportant, different specifications would result in highly correlated measures, and would not
much affect the ordinal ranking of the states in terms of revenue diversity. As will be
demonstrated, this is not the case. Different specifications of the HHI are calculated, and
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these specifications are compared with one another through correlation coefficients, the
ranking of the states that results from the specific calculation strategy employed, and the
raw measures of diversity obtained by employing each individual specification.18

2.5.1 Tax Categories with Varying Levels of Disaggregation
The first type of variation considered is simply the number of categories included in the
calculation of the HHI, as this remains unstandardized throughout the literature. Only
Census Bureau designated “tax” categories (as opposed to user fees or charges) are included
for two reasons. First, this is an extremely common specification in the literature, and
revenue sources outside of the most common tax mechanisms are not often considered.
Second, this choice serves to isolate the effect of category number, as opposed to the effects
of expanding into different revenue categories entirely.
The first formulation employed, HHI1 , is the original formulation of the HHI (equation
1 above) with five categories: sales, property, individual income tax, corporate income
tax, and other. The second formulation, HHI2 , employs the same categories but uses the
modified HHI formula (equation 2 above). The third formulation, HHI3 , includes the motor
vehicle tax as a separate category, identical to the graphical illustration of revenue trends
displayed above. The final formulation, HHI4 , disaggregates into all 17 tax categories
18 This

method of comparison is similar to the one employed by Suyderhoud (1994), who illustrated the
potential impact of including four, rather than three, tax categories; this was in direct response to a three
category specification which had been proposed as a literature standard.
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Table 1: Correlation Coefficients for Varying Levels of Disaggregation
HHI1
HHI2
HHI3
HHI4
HHI1 1.0000
HHI2 -1.0000 1.0000
HHI3 -0.9500 0.9500 1.0000
HHI4 -0.7271 0.7271 0.8912 1.0000
reported by the Census Bureau.19 All of these formulations utilize the exact same figure
for total tax revenue, and all the same revenues are included somewhere; the only difference
is the level of disaggregation into different tax categories.
Table 1 below shows the correlation coefficients for these different calculations of the
HHI. Of immediate note is the fact that the two different HHI formulations when they
include the same revenue categories (HHI1 and HHI2 ), are perfectly correlated with one
another. This would be expected, since the foundation of each equation (the sum of squared
revenue categories) is the same, and the only differences are the direction of interpretation
and a scaling factor. The interpretation of these different measures varies, but the mechanics
behind them do not. When one additional sizable revenue category is included (HHI3 ),
the correlation remains extremely high, but is no longer perfect. When a great deal of
categories are separated out (HHI4 ), the correlation falls more substantially.
The correlations discussed above provide some preliminary evidence about variation
between the different measures. However, it is also worth considering how much this variation results in real differences in the comparison of revenue diversity between the states.
19 These

categories are: property tax, general sales tax, individual income tax, corporate income tax, motor
fuels tax, alcoholic beverage tax, amusement tax, insurance premium tax, parimutuels tax, public utility tax,
tobacco tax, other select sales tax, alcoholic beverage license tax, corporation license tax, motor vehicle
license tax, motor vehicle operation license tax, and death and gift tax.
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Tables 2 and 3 show the rankings of each state, from most diversified to least diversified,
for 2012, according to each of the different HHI formulations. The table also includes the
absolute difference between the highest ranking a state attains and the lowest. Two states
do not vary at all across the ranking, including the consistently least-diversified Oregon
and, inexplicably, the 10th most diversified state (which is curiously Oregon’s alphabetical
neighbor, Oklahoma). A substantial number of states display very small variation in their
rankings, in the range of 1-5 place differences. However, there are several states that differ
enormously, based on the number of revenue categories included. New Hampshire leads
this group, going from the 35th most diversified state in the simplest formulations, but the
most diversified state of all if all tax categories are included. Delaware and Montana are
also display an impressive jump in rankings (with a difference of 22) when the full set of
revenue categories are included. A number of additional states also change substantially, if
not to such an extreme extent.

While this occasionally extreme variation in rankings offers initial evidence that the
number of categories included is important, such rankings can be subject to over-representing
the differences present, if all of the states are extremely similar in the overall value of the
HHI, and ranking differences only represent minor reorderings among them. In order to
demonstrate that this is not, in fact, the case, Tables 4 and 5 display the HHI values for all of
the states according to the final three specifications (the first is excluded because, utilizing
a different formula, is is not directly comparable). As with TABLE 3, the absolute differ-
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Table 2: Diversity Ranking with Various Levels of Disaggregation – 2012
State

HHI1

HHI2

HHI3

HHI4

Difference

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

5
41
20
2
33
30
32
42
45
36
37
19
11
17
14
28
3
12
9
8
38
4
6
22
34
31
29
46
35
16
21
39
25
23
24
10
50
7
15
26
48

5
41
20
2
33
30
32
42
45
36
37
19
11
17
14
28
3
12
9
8
38
4
6
22
34
31
29
46
35
16
21
39
25
23
24
10
50
7
15
26
48

4
42
26
2
35
30
33
39
46
36
37
25
13
17
14
32
3
9
11
12
38
6
7
22
34
16
31
48
20
23
27
40
24
21
19
10
50
5
15
28
47

3
41
30
6
37
29
31
20
46
39
36
27
17
18
19
34
5
7
13
15
42
12
11
21
35
9
33
45
1
22
26
43
25
23
14
10
50
2
16
28
47

2
1
10
4
4
1
2
22
1
3
1
8
6
1
5
6
2
5
4
7
4
8
5
1
1
22
4
3
34
7
6
4
1
2
10
0
0
5
1
2
1
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Table 3: Diversity Ranking with Various Levels of Disaggregation – 2012 (cont.)
State

HHI1

HHI2

HHI3

HHI4

Difference

Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

43
49
27
1
40
44
13
18
47

43
49
27
1
40
44
13
18
47

41
45
29
1
43
44
8
18
49

40
38
32
4
44
48
8
24
49

3
11
5
3
4
4
5
6
2

ence between the highest and lowest values obtained is included. The average difference
for all states is 0.07, which appears small but is quite significant, once you consider that
the HHI is interpreted as a 0-1 scale from perfect concentration to perfect diversification.
The maximum difference is 0.11, or an 11% difference in the HHI, solely attributed to the
number of categories included in the equation.

New Hampshire, the state with the greatest ranking change, has an HHI change which
is one of the largest in the sample at 0.10. However, the matchup between ranking changes
and HHI differentials is not always so well-matched; the other standouts in ranking changes
(Delaware and Montana) do not display a large amount of HHI difference, while some of
the states that display the largest variation in the HHI don’t change much in ranking (e.g.
California, Georgia, and Massachusetts). Still, most of the high-value HHI differences are
associated with states that have moderate values in ranking change. While these parallels may illustrate that the alternate metrics are not particularly strong correlates of each
other, both still offer substantial variation, and illustrate the importance of variability in the
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Table 4: Diversity Measures with Varying Levels of Disaggregation – 2012
State
HHI2 HHI3 HHI4 Difference
Alabama
0.892 0.893 0.843
0.050
Alaska
0.734 0.724 0.684
0.050
Arizona
0.841 0.823 0.736
0.106
Arkansas
0.923 0.902 0.809
0.114
California
0.812 0.788 0.703
0.109
Colorado
0.815 0.807 0.737
0.077
Connecticut
0.812 0.794 0.735
0.078
Delaware
0.731 0.743 0.768
0.037
Florida
0.639 0.655 0.627
0.028
Georgia
0.792 0.773 0.691
0.100
Hawaii
0.788 0.764 0.705
0.082
Idaho
0.844 0.829 0.743
0.100
Illinois
0.866 0.849 0.789
0.077
Indiana
0.853 0.843 0.781
0.073
Iowa
0.857 0.846 0.773
0.084
Kansas
0.825 0.805 0.720
0.105
Kentucky
0.904 0.897 0.814
0.090
Louisiana
0.864 0.868 0.808
0.060
Maine
0.871 0.863 0.790
0.081
Maryland
0.875 0.860 0.789
0.086
Massachusetts 0.783 0.760 0.683
0.101
Michigan
0.894 0.874 0.796
0.099
Minnesota
0.884 0.870 0.800
0.084
Mississippi
0.837 0.832 0.767
0.070
Missouri
0.802 0.790 0.713
0.090
Montana
0.813 0.843 0.800
0.044
Nebraska
0.824 0.806 0.720
0.104
Nevada
0.636 0.648 0.642
0.012
New Hampshire 0.793 0.837 0.896
0.102
New Jersey
0.856 0.831 0.767
0.090
New Mexico
0.839 0.823 0.744
0.096
New York
0.762 0.742 0.681
0.081
North Carolina 0.833 0.830 0.755
0.077
North Dakota
0.837 0.837 0.761
0.075
Ohio
0.835 0.839 0.790
0.049
Oklahoma
0.870 0.865 0.800
0.071
Oregon
0.557 0.562 0.525
0.037
Pennsylvania
0.876 0.883 0.846
0.037
Rhode Island
0.857 0.845 0.789
0.068
South Carolina 0.831 0.819 0.741
0.091
South Dakota
0.620 0.650 0.618
0.032
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Table 5: Diversity Measures with Varying Levels of Disaggregation – 2012 (cont.)
State
HHI2 HHI3 HHI4 Difference
Tennessee
0.712 0.725 0.690
0.035
Texas
0.617 0.657 0.697
0.080
Utah
0.828 0.813 0.732
0.096
Vermont
0.925 0.910 0.840
0.085
Virginia
0.737 0.721 0.651
0.086
Washington 0.653 0.658 0.613
0.045
West Virginia 0.859 0.868 0.808
0.060
Wisconsin
0.851 0.839 0.761
0.090
Wyoming
0.636 0.620 0.555
0.080
measurement of diversity.

2.5.2 Revenue Categories, Broadly Defined
In order to not confuse the modifications made here with modifications to the number of
categories discussed above, a baseline specification is required. Since it has already been
utilized so extensively in this paper, and is very highly correlated with what one might
approximate as the “classic” formulation of the HHI, including only the four principal tax
categories and an “other” category, HHI3 will be utilized as this baseline for the subsequent analysis. Alternate revenue categories are included both separately and in unison,
in order to illustrate the variation that each can induce, if included in revenue diversity
measurements. HHI5 incorporates the full set of “use” fees, as defined by the Census Bureau, in the total consideration of revenues. HHI6 considers newly issued public debt as
a separate revenue category. HHI7 includes intergovernmental revenue (from the federal
government) as a separate source. Finally, HHI8 includes all of these revenue streams in
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Table 6: Correlation Coefficients for Alternate Revenue Categories
HHI3
HHI5
HHI6
HHI7
HHI8
HHI3 1.0000
HHI5 0.3993 1.0000
HHI6 0.8683 0.3406 1.0000
HHI7 0.6509 0.3051 0.5951 1.0000
HHI8 0.2119 0.8731 0.2648 0.4408 1.0000
conjunction with one another.
Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients between each of these measures. Of immediate note is that the correlation between such measures degrades rapidly, as more revenue categories are included. The pattern of the correlations is particularly interesting. As
discussed above, including debt or intergovernmental revenue raises the greatest theoretical challenges, depending on how one is modeling human behavior. Even so, comparing
these formulations to the baseline, correlations remain fairly high (especially for HHI6 , the
formulation with debt included). The formulation including the full set of user fees and
charges (HHI5 ), however, which is a conceptually unproblematic extension, has a notably
low correlation with the baseline formulation. As this strategy is the most common deviation from the baseline in the literature (if a deviation is involved at all), this is potentially
extremely significant.
Tables 7 and 8 present the state rankings for revenue diversity under these alternate
specifications. Of immediate note is that the rankings can be extremely volatile, to a greater
extent than is generally observed with the simple category number variation seen above.
Alabama, with quite stable rankings in all of the previous formulations, provides a very
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stark example; it drops from the 4th most diverse state in the baseline specification to 50th
when user fees and charges are incorporated. Sixteen states have changes in rankings of 25
positions or greater. Only Wyoming, with rankings near the bottom in every specification
seen so far, remains quite stable.

Tables 9 and 10 display the raw HHI values for the states along these measures. Here
too, a greater amount of variability is observed than in the previous specifications. The
average difference between a state’s highest and lowest value is 0.13, and there are notable
cases of extreme variation. Unsurprisingly, given what happened in the rankings, Alabama
leads here as well, with a maximum difference of 0.44 – almost half of the entire range of
the HHI. Other states displaying a high level of variability (maximum differences of over
0.2) include Alaska, Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, and Washington.
This is in comparison to the variation in Tables 4 and 5, where the maximum difference in
HHI measurement was 0.11. While the number of categories included displays an impressive capacity for altering the measurement, the choice of categories included increases that
capacity substantially.

One additional note is that the differences in ranking and measurement remain relatively
distinct – states that have the largest change in rankings do not necessarily have the largest
changes in absolute measurement, aside from particularly extreme cases, such as Alabama.
However, these differences match up quite a bit better than the differences in TABLE 3 and
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Table 7: Diversity Rankings with Alternate Revenue Mechanisms – 2012
State

HHI3

HHI5

HHI6

HHI7

HHI8

Difference

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

4
42
26
2
35
30
33
39
46
36
37
25
13
17
14
32
3
9
11
12
38
6
7
22
34
16
31
48
20
23
27
40
24
21
19
10
50
5
15
28
47

50
38
21
2
24
23
29
36
44
46
35
12
7
17
15
18
5
16
6
10
30
3
4
11
31
13
25
45
34
27
22
41
33
9
20
26
48
19
14
28
43

13
37
28
8
34
24
27
36
46
40
32
35
15
14
26
41
2
4
17
7
33
5
12
25
30
31
39
48
18
21
19
42
29
20
16
9
49
3
10
23
44

31
50
28
9
10
15
6
30
39
35
13
23
2
11
21
12
17
47
20
4
19
16
1
44
40
41
22
37
29
3
45
32
14
18
26
36
46
5
25
34
48

50
49
29
30
7
5
4
24
40
39
6
33
1
10
26
21
17
44
27
3
8
18
2
47
34
32
37
38
16
9
42
36
25
20
23
35
45
12
15
28
41

46
13
8
28
28
25
29
15
7
11
31
23
14
7
12
29
15
43
21
9
30
15
11
36
10
28
17
11
18
24
26
10
19
12
10
27
5
16
15
11
7
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Table 8: Diversity Rankings with Alternate Revenue Mechanisms – 2012 (cont.)
State

HHI3

HHI5

HHI6

HHI7

HHI8

Difference

Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

41
45
29
1
43
44
8
18
49

39
47
32
1
40
42
8
37
49

45
50
22
1
38
43
6
11
47

43
42
27
7
24
38
33
8
49

46
43
19
11
13
22
31
14
48

7
8
13
10
30
22
27
29
2

TABLE 4, where only the number of categories is changing. The correlation between the
differences here is 0.27, while the correlation between the previous set of measurements
was 0.07.

2.5.3 Visibility Controls
The final modification to the HHI to be considered, based on the discussion above, is the incorporation of visibility concerns. Most often, this is achieved by employing an additional
variable, included in empirical analyses alongside the HHI. Pommerehne and Schneider
(1978) provide an example of altering the HHI to reflect issues of visibility. Taking advantage of the HHI’s computational quality of giving additional weight to larger categories,
they group the most visible categories into a single category. However, this is a curious
strategy, since it results in an index with a higher concentration score. Thus, the idea of
including a separate visibility index of some sort is preferable, as the literature seems to
have decided. As such, this section presents a side-by-side comparison of both a standard
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Table 9: Diversity Measures with Alternate Revenue Mechanisms – 2012
State
HHI3 HHI5 HHI6 HHI7 HHI8 Difference
Alabama
0.893 0.461 0.896 0.816 0.639
0.435
Alaska
0.724 0.834 0.835 0.544 0.716
0.291
Arizona
0.823 0.873 0.868 0.820 0.893
0.072
Arkansas
0.902 0.934 0.899 0.860 0.893
0.074
California
0.788 0.869 0.849 0.860 0.920
0.132
Colorado
0.807 0.870 0.879 0.848 0.922
0.115
Connecticut
0.794 0.853 0.872 0.871 0.927
0.133
Delaware
0.743 0.838 0.839 0.817 0.899
0.156
Florida
0.655 0.797 0.738 0.782 0.866
0.210
Georgia
0.773 0.788 0.824 0.803 0.866
0.093
Hawaii
0.764 0.839 0.855 0.854 0.921
0.157
Idaho
0.829 0.891 0.848 0.830 0.883
0.062
Illinois
0.849 0.903 0.893 0.893 0.938
0.089
Indiana
0.843 0.878 0.894 0.859 0.919
0.076
Iowa
0.846 0.886 0.875 0.833 0.895
0.062
Kansas
0.805 0.877 0.818 0.858 0.901
0.096
Kentucky
0.897 0.908 0.928 0.844 0.910
0.084
Louisiana
0.868 0.882 0.913 0.714 0.846
0.200
Maine
0.863 0.908 0.889 0.836 0.894
0.072
Maryland
0.860 0.895 0.906 0.873 0.929
0.069
Massachusetts 0.760 0.853 0.852 0.837 0.920
0.160
Michigan
0.874 0.917 0.909 0.846 0.904
0.071
Minnesota
0.870 0.912 0.896 0.897 0.930
0.060
Mississippi
0.832 0.891 0.877 0.753 0.841
0.138
Missouri
0.790 0.853 0.864 0.778 0.881
0.103
Montana
0.843 0.890 0.856 0.767 0.890
0.124
Nebraska
0.806 0.866 0.824 0.832 0.867
0.061
Nevada
0.648 0.789 0.694 0.799 0.866
0.218
New Hampshire 0.837 0.845 0.888 0.819 0.910
0.091
New Jersey
0.831 0.864 0.881 0.877 0.920
0.089
New Mexico
0.823 0.871 0.884 0.741 0.856
0.143
New York
0.742 0.829 0.806 0.814 0.875
0.133
North Carolina 0.830 0.845 0.865 0.848 0.895
0.066
North Dakota
0.837 0.896 0.884 0.838 0.902
0.065
Ohio
0.839 0.876 0.891 0.821 0.900
0.079
Oklahoma
0.865 0.864 0.899 0.802 0.881
0.097
Oregon
0.562 0.761 0.693 0.728 0.845
0.283
Pennsylvania
0.883 0.876 0.917 0.873 0.917
0.044
Rhode Island
0.845 0.887 0.898 0.823 0.913
0.090
South Carolina 0.819 0.860 0.880 0.807 0.894
0.087
South Dakota
0.650 0.798 0.790 0.705 0.858
0.208
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Table 10: Diversity Measures with Alternate Revenue Mechanisms – 2012 (cont.)
State
HHI3 HHI5 HHI6 HHI7 HHI8 Difference
Tennessee
0.725 0.834 0.753 0.763 0.843
0.118
Texas
0.657 0.772 0.692 0.766 0.846
0.190
Utah
0.813 0.847 0.881 0.821 0.903
0.090
Vermont
0.910 0.936 0.931 0.870 0.918
0.066
Virginia
0.721 0.832 0.832 0.828 0.916
0.195
Washington 0.658 0.798 0.796 0.798 0.901
0.243
West Virginia 0.868 0.898 0.907 0.811 0.890
0.096
Wisconsin
0.839 0.835 0.897 0.870 0.915
0.081
Wyoming
0.620 0.723 0.723 0.663 0.735
0.115
concentration index (the same baseline HHI3 as before), and a visibility ratio, constructed
by putting the revenue from traditionally considered “visible” taxes (individual income and
property) over total tax revenue.20 Tables 11 and 12 below present these comparisons, both
in terms of state rankings and absolute measurement.

There is substantial variation between the two measures, as would be expected since
they measure two different phenomena. Oregon, for example, is 50th in terms of revenue
diversity, but first in terms of revenue visibility (owing to its heavy reliance on the individual income tax). Still, the overall correlation between the two is actually pronounced, at
least compared with some of the measurement correlations seen above, with a correlation
coefficient of 0.36. There is, overall, not a total disconnect between revenue diversity and
the reliance on more visible tax mechanisms. States that have a more diversified revenue
structure tend, on average, to rely more heavily on more visible forms of taxation. How20 Which

revenue categories are particularly visible remains a theoretical matter – there are, to my knowledge, no studies which actually seek to empirically assess or quantify which tax or revenue mechanisms are
particularly visible to the population, in a behavioral sense.
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Table 11: Diversity and Visibility Rankings and Measures
Rank
Measure
State
HHI3 Visibility Ratio HHI3 Visibility Ratio
Alabama
4
28
0.893
0.382
Alaska
42
44
0.724
0.181
Arizona
26
36
0.823
0.301
Arkansas
2
19
0.902
0.427
California
35
7
0.788
0.518
Colorado
30
9
0.807
0.489
Connecticut
33
11
0.794
0.486
Delaware
39
14
0.743
0.452
Florida
46
48
0.655
0.000
Georgia
36
8
0.773
0.495
Hawaii
37
38
0.764
0.284
Idaho
25
31
0.829
0.378
Illinois
13
18
0.849
0.437
Indiana
17
37
0.843
0.295
Iowa
14
26
0.846
0.391
Kansas
32
22
0.805
0.412
Kentucky
3
24
0.897
0.404
Louisiana
9
35
0.868
0.317
Maine
11
23
0.863
0.408
Maryland
12
12
0.860
0.472
Massachusetts
38
6
0.760
0.542
Michigan
6
30
0.874
0.379
Minnesota
7
16
0.870
0.443
Mississippi
22
41
0.832
0.230
Missouri
34
10
0.790
0.488
Montana
16
3
0.843
0.581
Nebraska
31
20
0.806
0.425
Nevada
48
46
0.648
0.041
New Hampshire
20
40
0.837
0.230
New Jersey
23
21
0.831
0.419
New Mexico
27
39
0.823
0.284
New York
40
5
0.742
0.563
North Carolina
24
13
0.830
0.463
North Dakota
21
43
0.837
0.185
Ohio
19
32
0.839
0.363
Oklahoma
10
33
0.865
0.362
Oregon
50
1
0.562
0.703
Pennsylvania
5
34
0.883
0.322
Rhode Island
15
27
0.845
0.390
South Carolina
28
25
0.819
0.395
South Dakota
47
49
0.650
0.000
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Table 12: Diversity and Visibility Rankings and Measures (cont.)
Rank
Measure
State
HHI3 Visibility Ratio HHI3 Visibility Ratio
Tennessee
41
47
0.725
0.016
Texas
45
50
0.657
0.000
Utah
29
17
0.813
0.439
Vermont
1
4
0.910
0.573
Virginia
43
2
0.721
0.586
Washington
44
45
0.658
0.113
West Virginia
8
29
0.868
0.381
Wisconsin
18
15
0.839
0.450
Wyoming
49
42
0.620
0.209
ever, the relationship is weak enough, and there are enough divergent cases, to retain the
concern that visibility is an important addition to empirical investigations about the revenue structure. This seems to be reinforced by the fact that including visibility tends to
consistently change findings in fiscal illusion studies.

2.6 Discussion and Conclusion

As has been presented above, both theoretically and demonstrably, through the comparison
of alternate strategies, the measurement of revenue diversity is a complicated and nuanced
consideration. There are many choices to be made: the specific formula to be utilized, the
number of revenue categories to be included, the definition and scope of said categories,
and whether or not a single index is enough to capture all relevant information about the
revenue structure. This paper by no means seeks to offer the end-all recommendation on
how this measurement should be done. Indeed, there is no universal answer to the question
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of diversity measurement, in large part because the applications of the measure are so
diverse. Rather, the objective here is to codify and raise various issues involved, and offer
guidance about the concerns that should be addressed in future empirical studies which
include revenue diversity as a key variable.
Before ruminating on the variations that should be considered in measuring revenue diversity, it should be noted that a case can be made for converging upon a single formulation
of the measure. Doing so would allow greater comparability among studies. As science is
a slow process driven by the aggregation of empirical results between different individual
investigations, this is an attractive aim. However, there is a tradeoff to be made between
comparability and precision. And given the variable application of diversity in the empirical literature, the role of precision takes on additional importance. Different applications of
revenue diversity raise different issues concerning measurement, and this is likely to result
in the need for different specifications.
Final decisions about measurement are extremely likely to vary based on the particular
empirical exercise in question. There are many relevant questions that should be asked during this process. (1) Who is the key actor being considered, whose behavior is driving the
model? This could be individual citizens, the government as a whole, elected politicians,
or public financial managers. Each of these actors has different motivations and incentives,
and the meaning of revenue diversity thus takes on different connotations and should perhaps include different components. The fiscal illusion literature provides a key example;
it derives most of its action through the perceptions and behavior of individual citizens,
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and thus benefits greatly from the inclusion of visibility concerns, which are defined from
the citizen’s point of view but are largely meaningless to a public finance administrator.
(2) Which revenue categories are theoretically relevant to the actors involved? As an example, intergovernmental revenue is likely irrelevant to an individual citizen’s decisionmaking
process, because it is never directly paid to the government. It is, however, quite relevant
to decisionmakers as the governmental level, because it is often an important source of
revenue to the states. (3) To what variable is revenue diversity being related? In the fiscal
illusion literature, it is generally related to public expenditures, or occasionally to overall
tax revenue. In the fiscal stabilization literature, it is generally related to revenue volatility. These variables have their own scopes, which can be variably defined. If the other
variable in question includes capital expenditures, for example, it would be extremely odd
not to include debt as a relevant revenue stream, since these two processes are intimately
connected. The scope of the related variable should be important to the definition of the
scope of revenue categories that are included, and efforts should be made to make the two
as comparable as possible.
Still, there are no definitive answers to these questions, and data limitations may often
restrict the choices available to the analyst in making these measurement decisions, particularly at the local level of analysis. However, a troubling trend in the extant literature
is that these concerns are never even addressed. Despite the fact that all of the issues and
considerations raised in this paper have been around for decades, there is, particularly in
the recent literature, a general reliance on a basic four or five tax category HHI, and no
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discussion is offered as to why this particular formulation was chosen. And as has been
demonstrated, these choices can result in substantial differences in the final measurement
of diversity. Most ideal would be some level of sensitivity analysis, using different diversity specifications, when data permits. But at the very least, a conceptual justification of
the measurement choices made would be a valuable addition to the literature.
It is, perhaps, telling that the literature focusing on fiscal illusion is willing to incorporate visibility concerns, a modification which is generally associated with positive fiscal
illusion results. Meanwhile, the stabilization literature generally fails to incorporate visibility, and consistently produces negative illusion results while confirming the stabilization
hypothesis. This is not to imply that any authors, of any theoretical orientation, are making strategic choices in order to confirm their own hypotheses. Any individual piece in
the literature can point to a substantial scholarly history of doing exactly what it has done.
And many pieces default to the de facto standard measurement of diversity that has been
discussed, which further damages any claim of strategic behavior. But still, the current
variation in practice and lack of justification opens up the literature to speculation about
whether measurement specifications might be a contributing factor the results obtained.
This remains a confounding issue that could be at least partially avoided with a bit more
attention.
For practical purposes, there are two particular issues illuminated above that offer particularly relevant insights for the literature as it stands, outside of the more theoretically
contentious modifications proposed. The first is the not unsubstantial influence introduced
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by the number of revenue categories included, even when using exactly the same definition
of total revenue. All major applications of the HHI include an “other” category, containing
some collection of additional revenue sources. Further disaggregating these sources and including them explicitly in the HHI calculation makes a difference, and whether or not this
happens thus deserves attention and justification. Second, the inclusion of non-tax revenue
makes an extremely substantial change to the diversity measure in many instances. There
is no clear theoretical reason, on either side of the literature, to suggest why these revenue
categories should be considered as distinct from formally designated “tax” categories, and
in particular there no clear reason to exclude them entirely, as is often done.
As the contentions in the literature continues to be debated and new studies continue to
engage revenue diversity as a key variable, these measurement issues are past-due for more
a careful examination. A back-and-forth exchange has developed between pieces advocating one or the other competing hypotheses of fiscal illusion or fiscal stabilization. There are
no shortage of theoretical issues underlying this debate, which remain the focus of the current literature. However, these measurement concerns serve only to muddy the conversation
and call into question any of the results obtained therein.. Although standard practices may
be resistant to change, and it would be naive to expect a dramatic turnaround in diversity
measurement, the injection of greater critical consideration regarding the choices involved
would go a long way in strengthening the results presented in the empirical literature, and
hopefully lead to a solidified and less-contentious understanding of the role of the revenue
structure in the general public financial system.
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Chapter Three: Revenue Complexity vs. Revenue Diversity
3.1 Introduction

In the public finance literature, there is a notable and long-standing debate about the role
and purpose of revenue diversification, which is the reliance on a greater number of and
more evenly distributed tax and revenue mechanisms, as opposed to heavy reliance on one
or a few. From the political economy tradition, revenue diversification (or complexity, as
it is usually called there) is seen as a source of fiscal illusion. Due to the increasingly
complicated structure of the overall tax burden, expenditures can be expanded beyond the
optimal level that voters would actually prefer in the absence of the illusion. A counternarrative has developed more recently in the financial management literature: rather than
arising from the preferences of strategic policymakers, revenue diversification is a response
to revenue volatility, and it is a choice that enhances fiscal stability.
These two threads have developed with reference to one another, but largely separately,
framed as competing hypotheses and studied in separate empirical estimations. As a result,
definitive conclusions about the role of revenue diversification in the public financial system remain somewhat elusive. The purpose of this paper is to offer a new and integrated
investigation of the trends described above in the form of a theoretically unified model. In
the process, since the case for a unified model is based in no small part on empirical issues that exist within the current literature, the paper seeks to address identification issues
common to many past studies of revenue diversification – under-considered endogeneity
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between the key variables and omitted variable bias that results from testing the hypotheses
in isolation from one another.
The unified model developed herein considers revenue diversification, revenue volatility, and total revenues simultaneously. Employing the methodology of Granger causality
from (principally) the macroeconomics literature, the new model is tested using a statelevel panel of public financial and demographic data from 1977-2012. This methodology
exploits the opportunity to strategically employ and test lags in the data in order to study a
particular kind of relationship, known as Granger-causal, between all three of the variables.
The results lend support to some of the expectations of the model, while calling others into
question, including fundamental pieces of the two separate theories into which this literature tends to group itself. While unable to claim actual causality in the traditional sense,
these results raise many important questions and issues that should be addressed in future
work.
Section 2 of the paper provides and overview of the two contrasting literatures which
have looked extensively at revenue diversity and its causes/effects in the public financial
system. Section 3 raises theoretical and empirical issues that exist with the two separate
models traditionally utilized in the literature, and develops a unified model incorporating
the insights of the existing models. This is followed by Section 4, which explains the
empirical strategy including an overview of Granger causality methods, a description of
the data, and the estimation framework. Results of the empirical analysis are presented and
discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes with general observations and suggestions
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for future research inspired by the results.

3.2 Review of the Literature(s)

As intimated in the introduction above, past research considering the role of revenue diversification in the public financial system has largely developed among two separate and
competing camps in the literature. The most widely cited studies in the field generally either adopt one approach or the other, and even if they do consider both approaches, clearly
favor the conclusions of one over the other, in a zero-sum presentation. As such, each
of these two threads are briefly discussed separately below, with attention paid to the rare
opportunities that they sometimes intersect.21

3.2.1 Fiscal Illusion and the Revenue-Complexity Hypothesis
The original concern over the role of revenue diversity – or in this particular theoretical
construct, revenue complexity – was developed in the context of fiscal illusion, from the
public choice tradition of public economics. This is, generally, the idea that citizens underestimate their total tax burden and are thus willing to accept a higher level of expenditures
21 A note on terminology: the first thread in the literature, operating from a fiscal illusion hypothesis,
generally refers to the reliance on a greater number of revenue mechanisms as “revenue complexity,” in line
with the generally negative connotations that the concept carries in such studies. The second thread, operating
from a revenue volatility hypothesis, employs the more neutral term of “revenue diversification.” Despite the
difference in terms, both concepts refer to the exactly the same thing and are generally measured in the same
way. Due to the neutrality of “diversification” over complexity, as well as its dominance in the most recent
literature, this paper will generally default to the use of this term, unless specifically discussing its application
in a fiscal illusion framework.
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(and the accompanying revenues to finance them) than they otherwise would, because the
tax-price of such expenditures is misconstrued. There are various different proposed mechanisms as to why this might occur, but one of the principal mechanisms is widely referred
to as the revenue complexity hypothesis.22 This hypothesis proposes that increased revenue
complexity results in fiscal illusion because citizens split their tax burden between a greater
number of mechanisms, and thus never fully aggregate the total amount paid. As such, they
underestimate the cost of public goods and services and demand, or at least accept, a higher
amount than they otherwise would. Policymakers, in this theoretical framework, are opportunists and budget-maximizers, who exploit this form of illusion to expand public spending
in targeted ways so as to maximize their own chances of reelection.
This literature has its earliest roots over a century ago in the work of Puviani (1903)23 ,
rediscovered and brought to the forefront in the mid-twentieth century during the advent
of the public choice (chiefly by Buchanan, 1967). Wagner (1976) offers the earliest widely
cited empirical study of the phenomenon, using local government data from the fifty largest
cities in the United States and finding strong evidence for the revenue complexity hypothesis – that is, a more diversified overall revenue structure was associated with higher public
expenditures, controlling for other economic demand-side factors. This study has spawned
an extremely active empirical literature, yielding largely mixed results. A number of studies
22 For a

comprehensive overview of these various mechanisms, beyond the revenue-complexity hypothesis,
see Dollery and Worthington, (1996).
23 An English translation of Puviani’s work has never become reality. Accordingly, modern knowledge of
his works comes mostly from those scholars discussed above who rediscovered and popularized his ideas,
with a debt to the work of Fasiani (1951).
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have corroborated the positive spending effects found by Wagner, using some formulation
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure revenue complexity (Baker, 1983; Heyndels
and Smolders, 1994) or alternative measures, such as simply the number of revenue instruments utilized (Breeden and Hunter, 1985). Additional evidence has been provided for the
revenue-complexity hypothesis by directly studying citizens’ perceptions through survey
methods, and finding that their perceptions of the total tax burden are significantly reduced
in more diversified settings (Cullis and Jones, 1987; Sanandaji and Wallace, 2011).
Despite this plethora of empirical evidence in support of the revenue complexity hypothesis, there have also been a number of studies finding contrasting results. One early
example of this can be found in Munley and Greene (1978), which replicated Wagner’s
seminal study and yielded insignificant results after controlling for heterogeneity, measuring variables in per capita terms, and increasing the number of revenue categories from four
to nine (see also Schokkaert, 1987). The bulk of the empirical evidence against the revenue
complexity hypothesis comes from the fiscal stabilization literature discussed below, however, so I will ask the reader to temporarily defer his or her curiosity about additional
negative results.
During this period of mixed results, there has been one major modification to the consideration of revenue diversity that is commonly associated with a return to positive results
and support for the revenue complexity hypothesis: the consideration of visibility. The concept of revenue visibility refers to the idea that not all taxes or other revenue mechanisms
are equally perceptible to the citizen. As such, if one is trying to study revenue diversity in
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relation to citizen tolerance for expenditures, it is the perceived tax burden that is important. Diversification itself may serve to reduce the perceived tax burden (as was the original
hypothesis), but within a diversified structure, the relative reliance on more or less visible
taxes will also play an important role in the citizen’s final perception of his or her overall
level of taxation. There are number of studies that have found positive fiscal illusion results
by incorporating this concept in some fashion (Pommerehne and Schneider, 1978; Breeden
and Hunter, 1985; Nelson, 1986; Gemmell, Morrissey and Pinar, 1999; Sausgruber and
Tyran, 2005).

3.2.2 Fiscal Stabilization, Revenue Diversification, and Revenue Volatility
In response to the inconsistent results in the fiscal illusion literature, alternate explanations
for revenue diversification began to be considered. Chiefly, revenue diversification grew to
be seen as a potential solution for revenue volatility, or the instability of revenue streams
from year to year. The rationale behind this claim is that a government relying overwhelmingly on one particular tax mechanism is especially susceptible to economic forces that
affect that particular tax base. For example, a very heavy reliance on the individual income
tax will result in a revenue structure that is particularly sensitive to changes in the business
cycle which affect employment. Diversifying revenue streams serves to minimize volatility
by relying on multiple tax bases that are affected differentially by economic forces. The
original idea of diversification for the sake of revenue stabilization arose as a competing
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hypothesis to the revenue-complexity hypothesis and as a possible explanation for insignificant results in that literature (Oates, 1988, Misiolek and Elder, 1988).
Since that time, the stabilization literature has taken on a life of its own, and found generally negative and statistically significant relationships between the amount of diversity
and revenue volatility. Misiolek and Elder (1988) provide the first empirical evidence of
this relationship, while at the same time finding no evidence for the revenue-complexity hypothesis. A pair of widely cited studies in the financial management literature took up this
idea, finding additional empirical evidence for diversification as a tool for revenue stabilization, and separately testing (but finding no evidence for) the fiscal illusion relationship.
Hendrick (2002) studies municipalities in the Chicago metropolitan area, measuring diversity as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with four categories (property tax, sales tax, other
tax, and non-tax revenue). Carroll (2009) studies a panel of municipal governments in the
U.S. with a population over 25,000 from 1970-2002, also using four categories (property
tax, sales tax, income tax, and other tax) to measure diversity in the test for revenue stabilization, but utilizing count variables of the number of tax and non-tax revenues in the
test for fiscal illusion.24 Other studies have moved forward with the idea of a strong relationship between revenue diversity and stabilization, without comparison to the revenue
complexity hypothesis (e.g. Carroll, Eger, and Marlowe, 2003; Carroll and Johnson, 2010).
In general, the evidence for using revenue diversification as a tool for reducing rev24 It

is not clear why diversity is measured differently between the two hypotheses, since most studies
since the very earliest in the illusion literature (e.g. Wagner, 1976) has generally used some form of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as well.
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enue volatility and promoting stabilization is much more consistent than the evidence for
diversification as a tool to promote fiscal illusion, which has been consistently mixed over
the past few decades. However, the treatment of the two threads as mutually exclusive and
competing hypotheses has not been given sufficient conceptual treatment, and this may also
be driving some of the confusion.

3.3 The Case for A Unified Model
3.3.1 The Two-Model System
As generally treated in the literature described above, the theoretical framework employed
in the study of revenue diversification can be depicted by one of the two separate models in
Figure 5 below. Studies begin with the adoption of one of the two hypotheses, and as a result primarily study only two of the three key variables. Coming from a revenue-complexity
perspective, the basic model would follow the form of part A, with a resulting empirical
analysis that regresses public expenditures on a measure of revenue complexity (generally
an HHI) and a host of relevant controls for public spending. The expectation is that a higher
level of revenue complexity will result in a higher level of public spending, which is the
goal of the policymakers. Alternatively, starting from a revenue volatility perspective, the
theoretical insight is depicted by part B. Empirically, since scholars are looking for evidence that policymakers are choosing revenue diversity in response to volatility, with the
intent that it will reduce future volatility, analyses generally regress a measure of revenue
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Figure 5: Two-Model System

volatility on revenue diversity (again, generally an HHI) and relevant controls. The expectation is that increased volatility will be associated with a lower level of revenue diversity,
which is the justification for diversification as a policy tool. As noted above, there are a few
studies that attempt to directly contest the models against one another, however they do so
by running them as the foundation for separate empirical analyses.
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3.3.1.1 Theoretical Concerns with a Two-Model System
It may or may not appear clear to the reader that this separation of the two models poses immediate problems on both theoretical and empirical grounds. First of all, the fact that both
models rely crucially upon the same variable – revenue diversity – and both are the result of
an intelligible logic that many scholars have embraced since their inception, suggests that a
more system-wide viewpoint may be desirable. Perhaps it is true that policymakers choose
to increase revenue diversity for the sake of dampening revenue volatility, a problem which
makes long-term budgeting and planning extremely difficult. Perhaps it is also true that a
side-effect of increased diversity is increased public expenditures.25 These two hypotheses
might not actually be competing with one another, but may both fit as individual components within a unified framework which can offer new insights into the functioning of the
public financial system as a whole.

An additional theoretical issue, which is illuminated by the comparison of the two models side-by-side, is the relevance of feedback loops in the financial system. The revenue
volatility model essentially relies on the presence of a feedback loop in order to make the
logic of the model work, although that is usually not made explicit – policymakers respond
to revenue volatility with greater diversification, because it is expected that such movement
will result in future reductions in the level of volatility. The revenue-complexity model,
on the other hand, especially as traditionally written about, tends to completely ignore the
presence or significance of a feedback loop in the model. Policymakers are presumed to be
attempting the artificial inflation of public expenditures for their own electoral benefit. Lit25 And

for fiscal illusion skeptics, whether this is the intentional objective of opportunistic policymakers or
a naturally occurring side effect is largely irrelevant to the practical applications of such empirical research,
even if it is a theoretical sticking point.
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tle considered is the fact that pressure for greater expenditures may derive from elsewhere26
and be driving the increased diversity itself, as a necessity. Although some of these issues
are addressed in the empirical literature seeking to test the hypothesis with greater concern
for endogeneity, it is conceptually unsatisfying to leave it out of the theoretical model.

27

3.3.1.2 Empirical Concerns with a Two-Model System
The theoretical concerns with employing the two separate models as they stand naturally
spill over to empirical concerns about the results of the estimates obtained in the literature.
First and most directly, if a unified system should be in fact be modeled, which contains
all three of the identified variables of particular interest instead of only two, estimating a
model with only two of the variables opens up the concern of omitted variable bias. Some
of the studies mentioned above do include the third variable as a control, but many do not.
As such, the confusion in the established empirical literature as to what effects definitively
exist may be a result of this complication, which is automatically solved by developing a
model which explicitly contains all three of the relevant variables.
Additionally, the discussion of feedback loops above indirectly introduced a major concern with the empirical literature, which is the treatment of causality in either of the two
models. Both hypotheses and the empirical tests that result presume a causal direction in
26 In

the larger expenditure literature, one might think of “demand-side” determinants of public expenditures, such as those resulting from demographic shifts and changes in citizen tastes and preferences over
time.
27 This discussion of feedback loops begins suggesting the crucial importance of timing when considering
these trends, which forms the basis of the empirical exercise developed below.
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the model, yet few give much, if any, explicit treatment to the problem of endogeneity that
may be biasing the conclusions drawn from the analyses. Some of the initial backlash to the
earliest studies supporting the revenue-complexity hypothesis was posed along these lines,
and subsequent studies tried to correct for the concerns in various ways, most commonly
by using lagged values for explanatory variables. The employment of lagged variables is,
if carefully considered, an important improvement, especially because alternate identification strategies (such as the use of convincing instrumental variables) have proven nearly
impossible to devise in a satisfactory manner.28 However, even in attempting to address
this single issue in a limited way, these same studies still suffer from the above concerns.
Furthermore, even when a feedback loop is required for the theoretical integrity of the
model, such as the case with the revenue volatility hypothesis, the empirical testing as
established generally only considers it in a single direction. In this particular situation,
where the theoretical direction of the relationship reverses based on which causal pathway
is being pursued (diversification as a response to volatility, or volatility in response to diversification) it is particular problematic not to consider, in very clear and explicit terms,
the assumptions about and timing of the variables employed. The fact that the revenuecomplexity model generally ignores the feedback loop entirely is its own sort of serious
empirical challenge that makes any sort of causal relationship extremely difficult to establish.
In short, there are a host of issues which can be substantially improved upon by the
28 On

this, I speak from a great deal of personal experience.
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development of a single unified model. As illustrated above, the literature remains starkly
divided on theoretical grounds and thoroughly unsettled regarding empirical results. No
doubt this confused development was an inevitable and necessary precursor to the more
comprehensive approach proposed here, which attempts to combine the lessons learned
therein and hopefully provide convincing preliminary evidence for such an endeavor.

3.3.2 A Unified Model
In order to combine the two models discussed above, two simplifications must be clarified.
The first, once again, is the equivalence between revenue complexity and revenue diversity.
As the discussion of the revenue-complexity hypothesis as an independent model is now
complete, the concept shall henceforth be referred to solely as revenue diversity. The second is a switch from discussing “public expenditures” to discussing “total revenue.” The
reason for this is that it becomes much more straightforward and conceptually concise,
once considering the combined model presented below, to think of all of the key variables
involved as existing on the same side of the budgetary equation. And since changes in
total revenue should at least largely track changes in total spending this does not, by and
large, sacrifice the intuition behind the original revenue-complexity model connecting the
revenue structure to expenditures.29
29 This

equivalence is, of course, not absolute in practice, due to the practice of issuing debt (or, more
rarely, of operating at a surplus). However, this is not invalidating. The underlying concept whether specifically measuring total revenue or total expenditure is the overall size of government. The reader is invited to
revert to thinking about total expenditures any time total revenues are mentioned, if that proves more conceptually convincing, however total revenues will be utilized in the empirical analysis for consistency among the
varaibles.
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These clarifications thus allow for the development of a cohesive single model of the
revenue system with three relatively straightforward and logically interrelated variables:
total revenue, revenue volatility, and revenue diversity. The argument for including all
three variables can be strengthened even further by conceptualizing them as three separate
attributes of the same overarching variable of revenue, broadly considered. Total revenue
(mean), revenue volatility (variance), and revenue diversity (structure) are different features
of the same exact revenue system, broadly defined, and a change in any individual component is likely to be associated with changes in the others, providing further intuition that it
only makes sense to consider them simultaneously.30 With this in mind, Figure 6 depicts
a unified model in its most simplistic form, taking the two pieces provided by the models
above and combining them at their crux — the shared variable of revenue diversity.

Such a model achieves the crucial first step of unifying the variables into a simultaneously considered relationship. However, as many of the critiques raised above about
the two-model system suggest, there are some additional considerations that were lacking
from the original models and deserve more explicit consideration in the combined model.
This includes the addition of the feedback loop between revenue diversity and total revenue, allowing for demand-side pressures for more extensive government activity to drive
30 I

am indebted to J.S. Butler for first pointing out the ability to conceptualize the concepts in such stark
and simple statistical terms.
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Figure 6: A Preliminary Unified Model

the action, rather than policymakers’ strategic behavior. If there is a need for expanded
total revenues for whatever reason (most likely because there is a demand for increased
expenditures), diversification becomes a valuable and perhaps even necessary option. Simply increasing the tax rate on an existing tax base could lead to minimal or even negative
effects, if citizens sufficiently adjust their behavior in response to the higher tax. Diversification brings in a new and differently defined tax base (or bases), which potentially allows
for the expansion of total revenue while tempering these negative behavioral effects.
Additionally, once considering this unified semi-triangular system in which one variable is clearly related to both of the others, the question naturally arises as to whether there
is not some sort of connection between those other two vertices (total revenue and revenue
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volatility) as well. The brunt of the argument from either of the established perspectives in
the two-model system runs through the mechanism of revenue diversification. However, is
there a relationship between total revenue and revenue volatility, directly and outside of the
mediating pathways that run through revenue diversity? Natural expectations based on statistical principles would be for such a positive relationship to exist. While not of particular
theoretical concern here, one of the benefits of the empirical approach developed below is
that it allows for this relationship to also be tested alongside the others with no additional
complication.
Therefore, combining all of these insights, a more complete version of the unified model
is presented below in Figure 7. The feedback loops are included on both legs of the principle relationships, and the possibility of a direct relationship between total revenue and
revenue volatility is added. Although certainly more complicated and a fair deal “messier”
than the two separate models that past literature has tended to favor, I believe it does have
a certain intuitive appeal given the real-world complication of public financial processes.
Furthermore, the extant literature has been characterized by a state of debate and conflicting
results for the past several decades – the time may be right to consider a new approach.
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Figure 7: A Complete Unified Model

3.4 Empirical Strategy and Data
3.4.1 A Brief Introduction to Granger Causality
To the practicing scholar or experienced reader in empirical public finance, the theoretical
model depicted above will be readily recognized as extremely complicated and difficult
to empirically test. Successful causal estimation requires an identification strategy that
adequately addresses concerns of simultaneity and endogeneity, which is no easy task.
Quite outside of simplifying or rectifying those situations, as they exist in the past literature,
the combined model proposed above exacerbates it, by adding more feedback loops and
circularity to the logic than ever existed before.

Although challenging from an empirical perspective, it is nonetheless a necessary adjustment from a theoretical one. In most fields of applied economics, public finance being
no exception, the movement tends to be toward identification strategies that employ instru77

mental variables to convincingly establish causal pathways. However, there remain areas
where such an approach remains inaccessible.31 Especially after establishing the need to
consider such a complicated and interconnected system, the task of sufficiently and separately instrumenting every potentially endogenous variable, with the public financial data
available, is essentially insurmountable. However, this does not mean that alternate strategies are unavailable.
In response, I turn to an estimation strategy which is popular in another field which
often faces similar challenges – macroeconomics. This method is known as Granger
causality, as first elaborated in succinct fashion by Granger (1969). Although not particularly widespread in public finance, there have been recent studies that have returned to
this methodology in order to address difficult empirical questions along these lines (e.g.
Saunoris, 2015). The strategy employs the belief that at least some degree of predictive
causality can be established by demonstrating that a change in the dependent variable is
significantly related to changes in an explanatory variable at some point in the past. One
variable, x, can be stated to Granger cause (or G-cause) another variable, y, if incorporating
past information about x provides more accurate predictions about the value of y than could
otherwise be obtained. The basic logic of the concept is depicted below, in Figure 8.32

31 Even those published studies which have looked at only one half of the two-model system, where the
challenge of identification is even less, have failed to progress in the effort to address endogeneity issues by
use of instrumental variables, and at most resort to the application of basic lags.
32 Figure adapted from Kenny (1975).
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Figure 8: Granger Causality Logic

As the figure depicts, there two variables, x and y, which exhibit time trends, demonstrated by the horizontal arrows. In any given period, there is also reason to suspect that the
variables are affecting one another, represented by the vertical arrows. It is possible that
this relationship is happening in both directions (the problem with endogeneity, identified
above). The unidirectional diagonal arrow from xt−1 to yt represents the Granger causal
pathway. If a significant relationship, which aids in accurate prediction, can be identified
between the past value of x and the future value of y, the conditions for a Granger causal
relationship have been established.
The main critique of this line of reasoning is the widely-cited post hoc ergo propter hoc
fallacy of logic — that just because one event precedes another does not mean that it caused
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it. And since this is a clear and valid criticism in many lines of inquiry33 , Granger causality
is often construed as something of a weaker test than other causal identification strategies.
If a third or confounding factor is indeed causing them both, then any claim of causality
based on the justification of sequence can very clearly be unfounded.34 This discussion
gets to the heart of what we mean by the term “causes” and it may be complicated by
linguistic shortcomings. The true meaning of claiming Granger causality is that one event
contains information which is demonstrably predictive of another event — nothing more,
nothing less, despite the presence of the term “causality” which may indeed be a misnomer.
Whether one is willing to make the leap from Granger causality to causality in a broader
sense depends on what one believes is happening in the rest of the system in question.
Therefore, one’s confidence in the results of an empirical analysis run under the principles of Granger causality depends to some degree on one’s confidence that there are not
extremely relevant and unmeasured underlying forces which are potentially driving all of
the observed factors and making the sequence of events unimportant. In the case of public
revenues, it is extremely unlikely that this is the case. To begin with, the basics of the revenue structure (i.e. revenue diversity) are clearly chosen and established by policymakers.
So too, to a large degree, is the level of total revenue collected, since policymakers also
choose the tax rates on the existent set of taxes. Revenue volatility is the most outside of
policymaker control, since it can (especially if the revenue stream is undiversified) respond
33 In

a classic example: The rooster always crows before dawn, therefore the rooster crowing causes the
sun to rise.
34 To return to the rooster example — the confounding variable is the movement of the earth.
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dramatically to macroeconomic changes. As an extension, total revenue could also suffer
to a lesser degree from such an extra-system shift. However, these extraneous forces are not
unmeasurable – we can include direct indicators of macroeconomic conditions including
personal income and the unemployment rate. Additionally, considering that policymaker
behavior is the latent variable underlying so much of the intuition, we can include political
controls that capture broad partisan or ideological shifts among the people in power at any
given time. When dealing with such a financial system, which is relatively closed and has
its variables responding to general forces which can be sufficiently measured, the insight
one can take from the results of Granger causal models is appreciably increased.
Of course, one can still take issue the underlying assumptions and beliefs about such a
strategy, and many have. But the same is true of any identification strategy, often to even
more dramatic effect with an instrumental variable approach. Any attempt to demonstrate
causality requires a level of acceptance and belief that the argument being made – that any
given variable is substantially affects a but not b – relies on a convincing proposal and a
level of faith that the argument appropriately understands and captures the true state of the
world. In this regard, Granger causality, though more general and all-encompassing in its
approach, can be equally instructive if one is willing to accept the assumptions required.
And as the discussion above has attempted to demonstrate, this step goes, in some measure,
well beyond the steps taken by previous studies to establish causality in a serious way, given
the theoretical underpinnings of the broader situation.
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3.4.2 Data and Variable Measurement
All data are measured at the state level, annually, forming a panel dataset for all states
from the years 1977-2012. The financial data are taken from the Census Bureau’s Census
of State and Local Government Finance, as aggregated by the Tax Policy Center’s State
and Local Finance Data Query System.35 All figures are measured in real (2012) dollars
in order to control for inflation over the time period. Per capita measures are utilized, in
order to prevent the size of the state resulting in dramatic over- or under-representation of
particularly large and small states (in terms of population).
Total (per capita) own-source revenue is the aggregation of all tax revenues collected
by the state, in addition to other revenue streams such as user fees and charges that are
collected by the state government. As is standard practice when using such large figures in
econometric analysis, the variable is measured in natural log terms. In the literature, this
variable is often smoothed using a method such as moving averages to drown out some of
the noise. This was not an available strategy here, however, because doing so created a
problem of nonstationarity, which is further explained below.
Revenue volatility is a variable that must be calculated in such a way that it captures
the instability of total revenue from one year to the next. This paper adopts the approach
of Carroll (2009), which is in turn an adaptation of White’s (1983) method of measuring
the deviation between expected and actual revenue. Carroll’s modification is specifically
35 http://slfdqs.taxpolicycenter.org/pages.cfm

The Census of State and Local Government Finance is conducted, in full, every five years (those years ending in 2 or 7). The state-level data is updated annually in full,
while local government data is updated annually using sampling techniques.
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adapted to panel data, allowing for variation to occur across both different observations (in
this case states) and over time. In the first step, the natural logarithm of total revenue is
regressed on a time variable (t) and a set of dummy variables (i) for each state (excluding
one for a total of 49 individual dummies), as shown below in Equation 4.

Revenueit = exp(α + β1t + β2 i)

(4)

The actual measure of volatility becomes the absolute value of the individual residuals for each state-year observation, directly measuring how much actual revenues have
deviated from the predicted linear growth trend. A greater value of this (log) residual represents a greater deviation from expected revenues, and thus reflects an environment which
is characterized by a higher degree of revenue volatility.
Measuring revenue diversity is achieved, as is standard in the literature, by calculating
a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) using the percentage shares that different revenue
instruments contribute to total revenue. This index is calculated by summing the squared
revenue percentage (r) of each of j different revenue mechanisms, subtracting from one,
and dividing by 1 − 1j , which is a scaling procedure to simplify interpretation. This is
depicted below in Equation 5.
1 − ∑r2j
HHI =

j

1 − 1j

(5)

With this formulation, perfect concentration (all revenue being derived from a single
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revenue category) would result in an index value of 0, while perfect diversification (each
of the included categories contributing an equal share of revenue) would result in an index
value of 1. Seven separate tax and revenue categories are employed in the construction of
the variable: the sales tax, the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, the property
tax, the motor fuels tax, other taxes, and total user fees and charges.36
In addition to these main variables of concern, controls are included in the model to address those issues which are most likely to affect revenue patterns from outside the system.
Economic factors, capturing general macroeconomic performance and the socioeconomic
makeup of the population, include per-capita income, the unemployment rate, the percentage of the population receiving some form of welfare, and an income distribution measure.
Political factors, which may be driving differences in state revenue decisions, include the
governor’s party and the party composition of the lower house of the legislature. Table 13
below describes the specific measurement of each of these variables and the source of the
data.3738
Summary statistics for all of the variables described above can be found in the following
tables. As can be readily observed, significant variation exists across all of the variables
36 Choosing

the level of disaggregation among the categories — that is, how many individual mechanisms
to include as stand-alone categories as opposed to collapsing them into an aggregate category such as “other
taxes” — is a matter of choice, and the literature has not been particularly consistent on this matter. The
categories chosen here aim to strike a balance between a desire to disaggregate as much as possible, for a
richer measurement, and remaining in line with the standards of the literature, such as they are. For a great
deal more detail about the implications of these and other choices when measuring revenue diversity, I invite
the reader to see my companion paper which is dedicated to the subject.
37 Data sources marked with an asterisk were in turn drawn from an aggregated panel assembled by the
University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research. See the references for a complete citation.
38 The Frank-Sommeiller Price Series of state-level income distribution data is provided by Mark Frank of
Sam Houston State University. See the references for a complete citation.
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Variable
Population
Per-capita
income
Unemployment
rate
Welfare
Recipients
Income
Distrubtion
Governor’s
Party
Legislature
Composition

Table 13: Control Variables
Measurement
Source
Millions of residents
Census Bureau*
Bureau of Economic
Real 2012 dollars
Analysis and Census
Bureau*
Bureau of Labor
% unemployment
Statistics*
% of population
Department of Health
receiving AFDC or
and Human Serivces*
TANF payments
% of total income
Frank-Sommeillerrecieved by the top
Price
10% of earners
Series
1 if Democrat, 0 if
Council of State
Republican
Governments*
% of Democrats in
Council of State
lower house of the
Governments*
legislature

included in the analysis. It is instructive to observe the substantial variation present across
the sample as a whole — between all states over all years. This is presented in Table
14 below. However, this can also be misleading because in general, it leads to observing
the magnitude of difference between the smallest state in the earliest time period and the
largest state in the latest time period. This may serve to abstract from the more complicated
situation that results from panel data, in which both variation across time and across space
are important. In order to demonstrate that there is substantial cross-sectional variation
outside of temporal variation, Table 15 presents summary statistics for 2012 only, the most
recent year in the data.
In order to investigate temporal variation, it is worth considering parallel trends in the
three principal variables over time. Figures 9 through 11 below depict the national mean
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Table 14: Summary Statistics: All States, 1977-2012
Variable
Mean
Standard
Minimum Maximum
Deviation
(Log) Total
8.23
0.363
7.408
10.195
Revenue
(Log)
1.320
0.572
1.011
8.968
Revenue
Volatility
Revenue
0.859
0.087
0.183
0.957
Diversity
Population
5.358
5.877
0.402
38.000
(Millions)
Per Capita
25.061
10.780
7.018
59.663
Personal
Income
(Thousands)
Unemployment 6.048
2.145
2.300
17.400
Rate
% Welfare
0.028
0.018
0.001
0.085
Recipients
% Income to
39.540
5.659
22.697
62.259
Top 10%
Democratic
0.508
0.500
0.000
1.000
Governor
Fraction of
.555
0.173
0.160
1.000
Lower House
Democratic
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Table 15: Summary Statistics: All States, 2012
Variable
Mean
Standard
Minimum Maximum
Deviation
(Log) Total
8.528
0.288
8.075
9.725
Revenue
(Log)
1.295
0.338
1.082
3.331
Revenue
Volatility
Revenue
0.850
0.071
0.461
0.936
Diversity
Population
6.265
6.997
0.577
38.000
(Millions)
Per Capita
49.957
6.957
33.640
59.663
Personal
Income
(Thousands)
Unemployment 7.294
1.733
3.000
11.500
Rate
% Welfare
0.010
0.006
0.001
0.037
Recipients
% Income to
46.241
5.287
35.518
60.921
Top 10%
Democratic
0.400
0.495
0.000
1.000
Governor
Fraction of
.459
0.164
0.170
0.870
Lower House
Democratic
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values for each of the three major variables: total revenue, revenue volatility, and revenue
diversity, from 1977 until 2012. As can be observed, they depict a substantial amount of
change over the decades, although each displays different overall trends. Average total per
capita tax revenue displays a generally upward trajectory over the time period, with notable
dips in the early and latter 2000s, consistent with the timing of notable recessions. Average
volatility, after peaking in the early 1980s, remained quite low until spiking during the most
recent recession. Interestingly, the average level of diversification of state revenues has
actually decreased, more or less consistently, over this period. This is is in direct contrast
to the theoretical story of either perspective discussed above, which view diversification as
a tool to solve separate problems, and would thus expect it to be increasing over time. In
looking at these figures, however, it is important not to place too much stock in the average
trends; individual states can and often do experience very different paths.

3.4.3 Empirical Strategy
3.4.3.1 Estimating Equation
At its core, the methodology of testing for Granger causality is relatively straightforward,
and its application to panel data as opposed to strict time-series data (as is the case here)
has grown in practice over the last several years (e.g. Hartwig, 2009; Chen, Clarke, and
Roy, 2013). As mentioned above, the definition of the concept is that past information
about an explanatory variable significantly improves the predicability of the dependent
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Figure 9: Average State Total Per Capita Revenue (log): 1977-2012

Figure 10: Average State Revenue Volatility: 1977-2012
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Figure 11: Average State Revenue Diversity: 1977-2012

variable, above and beyond all other relevant information available. As such, the intuition
basic behind the model is not much more complicated than including lagged values of
the explanatory variables, as opposed to (or in addition to) contemporaneous values, in an
appropriate panel data estimation setup.
As this methodology rests on the ability to test for the predictive power of past information in the explanatory variables, it is difficult to ignore the possibility that lagged values
of the dependent variable are also important for optimal predictability. Including lagged
values of the dependent variable as explanatory variables is not allowed in more straightforward panel data models such as standard fixed or random effects, however, as the lag is
necessarily correlated to the unobserved heterogeneity captured by the panel-level effect.
As such, the preferred method for dealing with such a problem is the application of the
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Arellano-Bond estimator, a GMM estimator which was designed to circumvent this issue.
The basic structure of the estimating equation takes the form given by Equation 6 below.

q

Yi,t = α0 +

∑

l=1

βiYi,t−l +

r

∑

γi Xi,t−m +

m=0

s

∑ δiZi,t−n + ΛiCi,t + µi

(6)

n=0

Where Yi,t is the dependent variable for a given observation in a given year, α 0 is an
intercept, Yi,t−l are the lagged values of the dependent variable, with the number included
represented by q, Xi,t−m and Zi,t−n are the current and lagged variables for the key explanatory variables, up to r and s number of lags, respectively, Ci,t is a vector of contemporaneous
controls, and µi are the panel-level effects for each group of observations – here, states.
Tests for Granger causality operate under the null hypothesis that there is no relationship present, and thus must seek sufficiently compelling evidence that a relationship does
exist. In the most straightforward sense, this requires that the coefficients on the lagged
explanatory variables, those coefficients on X and Z above where m and n do not equal
zero, are statistically significant (non-zero). More formally, tests of joint significance of all
relevant lags (such as a Wald test) for any given variable provide more pointed evidence
about the degree of the importance of the past information provided by these explanatory
variables, generally.
This equation is estimated separately for different arrangements of dependent and explanatory variables — total revenue, revenue volatility, and revenue diversity — since the
causal pathways between either two of the variables may differ, as identified by the feed-
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back loops discussed above. The result is a full set of evidence about the system, and which
relationships contained therein do or do not display Granger causality.

3.4.3.2 Stationarity and Lag Structure
In adopting Granger causality methods, taken originally from pure time series analysis,
there are two important statistical considerations that must be addressed. The first is that
the time series contained must display the characteristic of stationarity. That is, the basic statistical properties of the variable (such as the mean, the variance, and the level of
autocorrelation from one period to another) are constant over time. Utilizing raw data,
non-staionarity often becomes a problem, since time series that depict variables that are
changing steadily in one direction (one can think about a generally upward trajectory in total revenue, as economic growth takes place) will necessarily be exhibiting changes in mean
and variance as a result. Standard methods to fix this problem include transforming the raw
data in some fashion (commonly logarithmic), detrending the data, and differencing.
Fortunately, the necessities of this model already incorporate some of these fixes. Verification that non-stationarity is not posing a particular problem can be obtained from performing unit root tests, a number of which have been created specifically for panel data.
A battery of such tests were performed on the three principle variables: the natural log of
total revenue, volatility, and diversification. An initial specification which used smoothed
total revenue data (a three year moving average) did experience substantial problems with
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non-stationarity, and smoothed volatility was borderline in the results of the tests. However, the unsmoothed versions do not suffer from the problem, and pass all of the unit root
tests similar to the other variables.
The other concern, key to the function of the model, is deciding upon the appropriate
number of lags to include and how far back in time those lags should go. For the lags of the
dependent variable in an Arellano-Bond model, a test exists to decide upon the appropriate
number. The test looks for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. If too few lags
have been included, this test will fail to reject the assumption of no autocorrelation at a
sufficiently high order. Performing the test on the models employed resulted in the use of
three lags for total revenue as a dependent variable, two lags for volatility as the dependent
variable, and one lag for diversity as the dependent variable.
Deciding on the number of lags to include for the explanatory variables, however, becomes a somewhat more subjective decision, and a balance must be struck between including enough to appropriately capture any autocorrelation that exists, but not including so
many as to make spurious correlation a serious concern. If too many lags are included,
the risk that one will display a significant level of correlation with the dependent variable
purely by random chance is increased. In making this decision, standard empirical practice
is to run the models with different numbers of lags and choose the model that provides
the greatest amount of explanatory power, as determined by an information criterion such
as the Bayesian (Schwartz) Information Criterion (BIC) or Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC). However, such a strategy requires the presence of a likelihood function, which does
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not exist when using Arellano-Bond, a GMM estimator which is outside the realm of maximum likelihood. As such, a reasonable number of different lags were attempted, none of
them qualitatively changing the results. As a result, the models with two lags for each of
the explanatory variables are the ones presented below.

3.5 Results and Discussion

The estimating equation above was employed three separate times, with each of the three
primary variables employed as the dependent variable, and the other two serving as explanatory variables. The results from each of these three analyses can be observed below
in Tables 16-18. Recalling the discussion about the methodology of Granger causality
above, we are looking for evidence that past information about the explanatory variables
(contained in the lags) has a significant impact on the prediction of the current values of
the dependent variable. The lagged values of the dependent variable are not of particular interest here, although their significance in every case offers additional justification for
the adoption of Arellano-Bond as the estimator, because these variables do clearly display
significant path dependence. The coefficients on the the current values of the explanatory
variables are also not a primary focus, because as is discussed further when interpreting
the results as a whole, they very likely suffer from the endogeneity concerns mentioned
above. Instead, the major focus should be on the coefficients on the lags of the explanatory
variables.
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Table 16: Arellano-Bond Results: Total Revenue
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Table 17: Arellano-Bond Results: Volatility
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Table 18: Arellano-Bond Results: Diversity
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The initial evidence for Granger causality can be identified by the presence of statistical significance on any of the lags of the explanatory variables, even if every coefficient in
the full set of lags is not significant. The formal test, however, is a Wald test for the joint
significance of the set of lags for each explanatory variable, separately. In this case, all
Wald tests determined joint significance, indicating the presence of Granger causal pathways between each variable and the two others. This, in and of itself, offers significant
justification that any study of these three variables needs to very carefully consider the endogeneity that exists between them, and that models which ignore these concerns will yield
empirical results that are likely problematic. However the real interest here arises from a
consideration of the direction of the relationships, and how those directions stack up to the
theoretical expectations laid out above. Figure 12 recreates the unified model, but includes
the direction of the relationships suggested by the Granger causal pathways identified. The
directions that are contrary to theoretical expectations are marked with a asterisk.

The positive feedback loop between total revenue and volatility is not particularly surprising – a greater mean is generally associated with a greater level of variance. However it
does demonstrably indicate that volatility is a consequence of growth, which increases the
importance of controlling volatility in other ways, if possible.
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Figure 12: Granger Causal Pathways in the Unified Model

Considering the relationship between total revenue and revenue diversification, the results are much more surprising and worth further consideration. The positive Granger
causal pathway between total revenue and and diversity offers justification for the argument
above that diversity might be a reasonable response by policymakers to a need for greater
revenue, contrary to the common story in the fiscal illusion literature, which focuses only
on the other direction. Looking instead at the pathway running from diversity to total revenue, the negative sign is extremely counterintuitive. The fiscal illusion argument would
suggest a positive relationship. Perhaps it would not be so surprising if this pathway simply didn’t exist – many have denied the existence of the strategic behavior involved in this
theoretical construct before. The negative relationship, however, is perplexing. It suggests
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that a more diversified revenue structure Granger-causes a lower amount of total revenue
and overall government size.39 While certainly inconsistent with the revenue-complexity
hypothesis, a negative feedback loop may be even further justification for the demand-side
story suggested by the positive result in the other direction. Policymakers may turn to
revenue diversification as a method for expanding revenues when faced with external pressure to do so; then, as the revenue base becomes more diversified, future revenue growth
is constrained. As has been established, the literature trying to establish the existence of
a positive result has been particularly contentious and remains unsettled. Given this new
piece of evidence which is contrary to the literature’s major argument, but consistent with
an alternative that is, to my knowledge, not explicitly recognized in that literature, it is
certainly a relationship that is worthy of greater theoretical and empirical attention in the
future.
Turning to the relationship between volatility and diversity, the results are also surprising. The positive Granger causal pathway running from volatility to diversity is in accordance with expectations. It adds strength to the side of the story implied by the volatility
literature, that policymakers are rationally responding to increased revenue volatility with
revenue diversity as a policy response. However, the success of such an action relies on
the establishment that this action will reduce future volatility. The evidence of a positive
pathway running in the opposite direction here makes this part of the narrative rather prob39 A

negative result has been obtained in a couple studies attempting to refute the fiscal illusion hypothesis
before, however not much consideration has ever been given to why this might be the case; rather, it was
treated as a statistical anomaly that more importantly demonstrated that the positive relationship expected
does not exist. Perhaps it is time to revisit the possibility that these were not random findings.
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lematic. We should observe that greater past diversity should be associated with less current
volatility, but this analysis suggests that the opposite may be true. If changes to the existing
revenue structure are justified along the lines of reducing volatility and improving the stability of the revenue system as a whole, which the analysis suggests is indeed happening, it
would be quite problematic if the changes are actually destabilizing.
While there is no readily available theoretical explanation for such a negative result,
this would suggest the extreme importance of future research dedicated to breaking down
and carefully analyzing the effect of revenue diversity on revenue volatility, perhaps by
more extensively decomposing the investigation into the volatility of individual revenue
mechanisms. The intuition behind the expectation for a positive result rests on the idea
that reliance on any one particular revenue mechanism to a large degree makes the entire
revenue stream overly sensitive to macroeconomic effects that particular affect that stream.
But concentration in and of itself may not the problem, and rather it is the specific mechanisms that are (or are not) concentrated that affect volatility.40

3.6 Conclusion

In considering any of these relationships, it is important to remember exactly what Grangercausality means, and even more importantly what it doesn’t mean. The relationships depicted above are ones of predictive association. They tell us that there is significant evi40 Preliminary

work on another paper which investigates this potential situation suggests that this may, in

fact, be the case.
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dence that information about one variable can lead to a stronger prediction about the future
direction of the others. This does not mean true causality, as the term is generally employed. Far from eliminating the need for alternate specification strategies which can get at
true causality in a more meaningful ways, the results discussed above exacerbate that need
for such efforts. If we want a full understanding of the mechanisms at play, particularly as
they relate to the structure of revenue streams which policymakers can and do change for
various reason, we need to build upon some of the issues and concerns presented here and
devise new and more rigorous ways in which to test specific components of the dynamics
of these interrelationships. However, any such efforts must also bear in mind the evidence
presented here (and suggested by theory) that these relationships are difficult to study in a
straightforward manner and require both theoretical and methodological rigor.
The main objective of this paper has been to apply a new approach to an old problem.
On theoretical grounds, the existing models that deal with the public revenue structure, as
it relates to the diversity of revenue mechanisms involved, leave something to be desired.
As a subsequent result, empirical findings that are based on such models are also called
into question. This is evidenced by a debate in the literature which has been ongoing for at
least several decades, and has roots that run much deeper. In order to move this discussion
forward, the new theoretical model and empirical methodology applied above have yielded
interesting and at times unexpected results. It may well have raised more questions than it
succeeded in answering, but that is not without merit. Rather than returning to a system in
which researchers adopt one theoretical story or another, and seek to confirm it explicitly
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at the expense of the other, with frequently mixed results and little forward movement in
the process, this analysis offers pointed directions for specific and fruitful lines of inquiry
in the future.
To name a few of these future directions: Do these predictive relationships hold up
in other public financial settings, such as cross-nationally or at the municipal level? Can a
negative relationship between revenue diversification and government size be demonstrated
in another way, and what might be the explanation for that when decades of conventional
wisdom suggest the opposite? Can we amass more and stronger evidence for the presumed
negative influence of revenue diversity on volatility, or is it actually destabilizing in certain contexts? Are there additional applications of this explicitly dynamic methodology in
public finance and other areas where it has traditionally not been employed? All of these
questions promise challenges, to be sure, but also promise the potential for a great deal of
interest and valuable insight as well.
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Chapter Four: Decomposing Revenue Volatility
4.1 Introduction

Although the literature continues to exist in a state of debate and competing claims about
the role and effects of revenue diversification in public financial settings, one particular
claim stands out as extremely policy relevant and worthy of robust understanding: that
revenue diversification serves as a tool for revenue stabilization, or decreasing the level of
revenue volatility that governments face. This is an extremely important objective, because
a volatile revenue stream from year to year can have extremely detrimental effects on a
functional budgeting process and the stable provision of basic public goods and services. If
government decisionmakers are indeed making decisions about their revenue streams based
on this intuition, it is essential to arm them with the best information available about if and
how to achieve the desired result.
A companion piece of this paper calls into question at least half of the customary beliefs
about this relationship. Employing a new empirical approach to exploit changes in timing
in the relevant variables, it found that states do seem to respond to greater revenue volatility with increased diversification, as expected. However, results in the opposite direction
(that greater diversification then reduces volatility) were actually negative, suggesting that
greater diversification leads to increased volatility. If this is true, it represents a serious
concern. However, there are also reasons to believe that part of this problem may derive
from an inadequately nuanced consideration and measurement of diversification.
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In most studies, revenue diversity is captured by the use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI). Employing the HHI alone to measure revenue diversification results in one
notable issue: while the measure captures the quantity of diversity rather well, it is completely agnostic about the quality of diversity. In a given year, two states could have an
identical value for the HHI, and in existent empirical models they would be treated as exactly equal in diversity. However, one of those states might rely principally on the sales tax
for revenue (at some percentage) while the other state relies principally on the individual
income tax for revenue (at the same percentage). Qualitatively, then, these states are quite
different. This qualitative difference becomes particularly important to study of diversification and volatility if the different revenue mechanisms have real differences in their own
inherent levels of volatility over time.
The purpose of this paper is to insert a consideration of these concerns into empirical
estimations, so as to better understand the complications of the relationship between diversification and volatility. Section 2 below provides a brief overview of the existent literature
which motivates this concern, drawn from diverse threads including the tax salience literature and optimal portfolio theory. Section 3 provides some preliminary empirical estimates
of revenue volatility, decomposed into separate revenue streams, in order to gain a sense
of the importance of qualitative differences between the streams which might contribute
more or less to overall volatility. Section 4 explains the empirical estimation strategy for
testing revenue volatility in the context of a more complete treatment of diversification,
introducing a new index to explicitly capture the effects of the underlying volatility of the
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revenue structure and building off the Granger causal methods developed elsewhere. Section 5 displays and discusses the results of this estimation, while Section 6 concludes and
offers implications for future research.

4.2 Review of the Literature
As suggested above, most of the empirical literature that tests the relationship between revenue diversity and revenue volatility does not explicitly consider the differential volatility
of different revenue streams, which is the problem that this paper seeks to amend. However,
it is worth noting the specific instances where scholars have drawn attention to the importance of considering differential attributes in the various revenue mechanisms available to
governments, in some context. Such attention tends to come from areas which are related to
the study of revenue diversification or revenue volatility more broadly, but not that specific
literature which takes the major objective of understanding that particular relationship.

4.2.1 Traditional Diversity and Volatility Literature
The study of revenue diversification began with the political economy concept of of fiscal
illusion, in which a diversified revenue stream was seen as a tool by which opportunistic
policymakers could obscure the full tax burden of citizens through a complicated mix of
revenues, and thus artificially inflate expenditures. This has yielded an active and continuing theoretical and empirical literature, which can be read about in substantial detail
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elsewhere. In response to this idea, the public financial management literature settled upon
the idea that revenue diversification could be seen as a potential solution for revenue volatility, or the instability of revenue streams from year to year. The rationale behind this claim,
basically, is that a government relying overwhelmingly on one particular tax mechanism is
especially susceptible to economic forces that affect that particular tax base. For example,
a very heavy reliance on the individual income tax will result in a revenue structure that is
particularly sensitive to changes in the business cycle which affect employment. Diversifying revenue streams serves to minimize volatility by relying on multiple tax bases that
are affected differentially by economic forces. The original idea of diversification for the
sake of revenue stabilization arose as a competing hypothesis to the revenue-complexity
hypothesis introduced above and as a possible explanation for insignificant results in that
literature (Oates, 1988, Misiolek and Elder, 1988).
Since that time, the stabilization literature has taken on a life of its own, and found
generally negative and statistically significant relationships between the amount of diversity and revenue volatility. Misiolek and Elder (1988) provide the first empirical evidence
of this relationship. More recently, a pair of widely cited studies in the financial management literature took up this idea, finding additional empirical evidence for diversification
as a tool for revenue stabilization. Hendrick (2002) studies municipalities in the Chicago
metropolitan area, measuring diversity as a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index with four categories (property tax, sales tax, other tax, and non-tax revenue). Carroll (2009) studies a
panel of municipal governments in the U.S. with a population over 25,000 from 1970-2002,
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also using four categories (property tax, sales tax, income tax, and other tax) to measure diversity in the test for revenue stabilization. Other recent studies within this vein of research
have produced similarly positive results for the hypothesized diversification/volatility relationship (e.g. Carroll, Eger, and Marlowe, 2003; Carroll and Johnson, 2010).
However, as noted above, a companion piece to this paper, focusing on other empirical
and methodological improvements to the study of these relationships, found evidence for
the relationship that is more qualified in a very important way. When controlling more
explicitly for the possible endogeneity between the variables by employing Granger causal
methods, there is evidence that diversification does increase in response to greater volatility,
but there is no evidence that volatility is subsequently reduced as a result of the increased
diversification; in fact, it may even increase. This finding, in addition to the unsettled
nature of the literature more generally, motivates research which considers more nuance
in the consideration of revenue diversification as applied to such studies. The findings
of that paper are qualitatively summarized in Figure 13, below. That paper, seeking to
unite divergent theoretical perspectives, united the consideration of diversity and volatility,
and also the connection between diversity and total revenue. Finding significant Granger
causal results in all directions, those results that were contrary to theory are marked with
an asterisk. Of particular note for the purposes of this paper is the positive relationship
flowing from diversification to volatility.
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Figure 13: Granger Causal Pathways Between Key Variables

4.2.2 Optimal Portfolio Theory

Although the thrust of this chapter is that the recent academic literature has under-considered
issues of the actual nature of the revenue mix, when it comes to volatility, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the literature has never addressed such concerns. The idea that
diversification could serve as a tool to reduce revenue volatility was derived from portfolio
theory in the corporate and individual finance literature. In the public finance realm, there
is a vein of work focused on identifying the optimal portfolio structure to achieve multiple
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goals in tax structure, one of them being the minimization of volatility.
The main focus of optimal portfolio literature is to balance these divergent and potentially competing goals when it comes to selecting revenue mechanisms and structuring the
overall revenue system. Although one of these goals is to minimize volatility for the sake of
allowing a stable and productive budgeting process, such a goal must be met in an governmental environment that is also seeking to achieve alternate objectives as well. One of these
alternate goals is to maximize growth, something that might be achieved through heavy reliance on a mechanism like the income tax, which grows rapidly in economic booms, but
is markedly more volatile during economic busts. Additionally, governments are politically beholden to design a revenue structure that is equitable for its citizens. Again, this
might lead toward a reliance on income taxes (which are generally designed to be explicitly
progressive) and severance taxes, as opposed to more regressive forms of taxation such as
the sales tax. However, such efforts, as suggested above and developed more fully below,
would generally lead to the most volatile of revenue structures.
Because these competing goals are so specifically defined and beholden to the particulars of the design of each relevant revenue mechanism, cross-sectional or panel studies
are not particularly applicable. As such, most empirical work in this field has taken place
within the confines of individual states. Harmon and Mallick (1994) provide an early study
which recognizes the three-part goal described above, instead of only focusing on volatility
and growth. Analyzing data from New York, they model each of the three competing goals
in terms of the revenue mechanisms, as those mechanisms were contemporaneously struc110

tured and utilized by the state. In doing so, they identify and note the variable instability
inherent to particular revenue mechanisms (finding that the income tax, sales tax, sin taxes,
and transport taxes were particularly low in volatility).
Gentry and Ladd (1994) perform a similar exercise, but compare two states: Massachusetts and North Carolina. In making the tradeoff between competing goals, a prominent place for the individual income tax is established in both cases, despite the fact that the
two states vary widely in terms of the structure of their particular income taxes, even if this
does come at the cost of marginally increased volatility. However, the authors make particular note of the fact that the different states, with their different economic environments
and existent tax structures, yield differing results when it comes to the actual optimum mix.
There does not seem to be a one-size-fits-all policy prescription when it comes to designing
the revenue structure.

4.2.3 Cross-sectional and Panel Applications of Mechanism Volatility Concerns
Although the most widely-cited literature in the study of revenue diversification and volatility, specifically, continues to look past the concerns of individual mechanisms and their
underlying volatility, there have been a couple recent examples that have sought to incorporate such concerns, in a more limited context. Yan (2012) considers the effects of revenue
diversification on volatility in the context of variations in the stability of a state’s overall
revenue base. If the state has a generally more stable base, then diversification does lead
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to decreased volatility, as the general literature would suggest. If, however, the state’s revenue base is inherently unstable, diversification does little or nothing to improve stability.
Kwak (2013) provides a rare example of a panel study that explicitly addresses the issue of
underlying volatility of different individual mechanisms, focusing on the sales tax and the
individual income tax. The paper utilizes pooled-OLS methods and demonstrates that the
specific structure of these two principal tax mechanisms can significantly alter the overall
volatility that can result by codifying specific exemptions from the general sales tax (e.g.
food and clothing) and the specific progressivity structure of the individual income tax.
Most applicable to the current study, Afonso (2013), studying shifting trends in local
revenue patterns, finds that the traditional expectation that diversification leads to greater
revenue stability must be qualified by the specific nature of the status quo revenue mix; diversification away from the relatively stable local property tax, and toward less stable taxes
such as local sales taxes, can actually lead to increased volatility. Forthcoming work by
Afonso further tests this hypothesis by comparing diversification in North Carolina among
municipalities (already relatively diversified with substantial reliance on more volatile sales
taxes, charges, and fees) and counties (still quite concentrated, with heavy reliance on the
more stable property tax). This empirical design has the advantage of comparing jurisdictions that have the exact same tax base, but are approaching diversification from different
starting points. Preliminary evidence suggests that diversification among the municipalities leads to greater revenue stability, while diversification among the counties leads to
decreased stability.
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Still, in these studies, there is a substantial reliance on a theoretical or even intuitive
sense of which revenue mechanisms should be more or less volatile than others, and this
is often a matter of debate. This discussion is extremely sensitive to several issues. First
are the issues of scope or level – different levels of government, even if collecting the same
type of tax or revenue, face very different situations which can affect the volatility of those
mechanisms.41 Second, the definition of tax bases varies substantially between different
jurisdictions. While this is well understood in the public finance literature, generally, it
is often under-considered when it comes to issues of volatility, specifically. For example,
states that exempt food from the sales tax (such as Kentucky) and states the include food
in the sales tax (such as Tennessee) have defined their sales tax base in fashion that could
likely result in notable differences regarding the underlying volatility of the sales tax. Tennessee’s sales tax incorporates one of the consumer commodities with the lowest elasticity
of demand, which could lead to greater stability, while Kentucky’s sales tax exempts it and
is made of a generally more elastic collection of goods. A large motivation for this paper
is to make an initial attempt to specifically measure and incorporate such volatility effects
into the study of revenue diversification.

41 Later,

in the investigation of the underlying volatility of various tax mechanisms at the state level, it is
found that at the state level, the opposite pattern holds from the pattern suggested in the Afonso research
at the local level – property taxes are the most volatile, while sales taxes are among the most stable. This
reversal could be explained by this issues of scope and level of measurement – at the state level, the property
tax is usually a minor component of state level revenue, while sales tax is generally a major component. The
state sales tax is difficult to avoid unless one lives near a state border, however the local sales tax is much
more easily avoided by traveling to neighboring local jurisdictions.
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4.3 Decomposition of Revenue Volatility by Mechanism

Building off the aforementioned unexpected finding of a qualified positive relationship between diversity and volatility, and the insights provided by the literature surveyed above, it
is important to more carefully consider revenue diversity not just as a phenomenon represented by a single index (the HHI), but rather to consider the individual parts that compose
it, in a quantitative fashion. Here, that means more carefully examining each of the individual tax or revenue mechanisms which are included in the calculation of the HHI. This
section will illustrate the measurement and variance of revenue volatility by mechanism,
rather than as a whole.

4.3.1 Methodology
The methodology for measuring diversity of individual mechanisms is adapted from the
methodology which is used to measure the volatility of total revenue below. Taken from
the strategy employed by Carroll (2009) as a panel data adaptation of the methods in White
(1983), the measure of volatility is calculated in two steps. First the logarithm of revenue
in each state-year is regressed on a year variable (t) and a set of dummies (i) for each
individual state (excluding one, for a total of 49 dummies). The estimating equation for
this stage is replicated below in Equation7.

Revenueit = exp(α + β1t + β2 i)
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(7)

After this estimation, the level of volatility is obtained by measuring the absolute value
of the (log) residuals for each of the state-years. A greater value of the residual reflects
greater volatility, because actual revenues divert to a greater degree from a linear growth
trend, which is adjusted for each individual state.
The adaptation here is that instead of conducting this exercise for total revenue, it is
instead conducted for individual revenue mechanism categories, such as the sales tax, the
individual income tax, user fees and charges, and so on. The objective is to identify average
differences in the volatility of individual revenue streams. This will provide preliminary
evidence of the average volatility effects of the different mechanisms, as well as directly
inform the subsequent analysis of revenue volatility and diversification. Although the intuition to the method is exactly the same, there are some adjustments that need to be made in
order to produce usable comparisons.
The first change required in the switch from total revenue to individual revenue categories results from the nature of decomposed data and the log transformation of the total
(by category) amount of revenue. A pure log transformation results in those states that have
no revenue in a particular category having an undefined amount of log revenue in that category, and thus being excluded entirely from the estimation.42 An alternative is to simply
replace any such missing values with a zero, However, it turns out that in this situation it
is best to exclude such observations in the first place. The reason is that including a large
42 When

dealing with total revenue, generally, there are no zero values in any state or any year – all states
bring in revenue from somewhere. However, when dealing with individual categories, there are a fair number
of observations measuring zero – some states simply don’t collect certain types of taxes or revenues.
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amount of observations where the state doesn’t collect any revenue in that category biases
the linear trend of the original regression downward, and it is upon this linear trend that all
of the residuals are based. Also, reporting zero volatility for a state that doesn’t have that
revenue mechanism in the first place is somewhat disingenuous, and doing so biases average volatility downward. As such, the volatility calculations are performed only for those
state-year observations that have a positive amount of revenue in any particular category.
Having addressed the issue of zero revenue, there is one additional modification that
must occur in order to make the data comparable between tax mechanisms. Since the
residuals utilized to measure volatility are (log) absolute in size for each revenue category,
they cannot be directly compared. Holding all else equal, a larger amount of revenue is a
consistent determinant of greater revenue volatility in absolute size. It is thus misleading
to directly compare volatility, as measured by the size of the residuals, without taking this
size effect into account. If mechanism A is simply larger in size than mechanism B, it
will likely have larger residuals. But this does not necessarily represent greater relative
volatility, unless those residuals are proportionally larger than would be expected because
of the greater size. In order to turn these residuals into a form that can be reasonably
compared, a percentage of volatility is constructed by dividing the log residuals by the log
value of the revenue.
This exercise is conducted for eight different revenue categories. These include: the
most commonly discussed tax categories of (1) general sales tax, (2) individual income tax,
(3) corporate income tax, and (4) property tax; two more specific tax categories that are at
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least occasionally very prevalent at the state level – (5) motor fuels tax and (6) severance
tax; (7) total general charges and fees, outside of the traditional tax structure; and, as
something of a baseline since it is not directly determined by the state government, (8)
intergovernmental revenue from the federal government.
There is one additional caveat to this estimation strategy that should be addressed. It
forces all states to assume a common time trend in revenue growth, with the only difference
between states being a change in the intercept, or actual level of revenue. This is true in
any application, whether discussing total revenue or its individual components. However,
this issue is thrown into relief by the previous discussion of the ways in which states can
differ in the construction of their tax mechanisms. In reality, each individual stream may
be expected to follow different growth trends in different states, depending on the structure
of the tax or charge and the nature of exemptions in each particular state. As such, it must
be kept in mind that the following results represent only average trends in the volatility
of different revenue mechanisms. Any particular policy prescription for something like an
optimal mix of revenues to minimize volatility must take into account the specific nature
of that state’s tax code, as is the practice in the optimal portfolio literature. But as so
much research continues to take place at a cross-jurisdictional level without considering
these details at all, focusing only on the overall level of diversity and not even beginning
to consider general differences in the volatility of the different mechanisms themselves, a
better understanding of even such average effects is a valuable addition to the discussion.
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Table 19: Revenue Volatility by Mechanism – National Averages

4.3.2 Results and Discussion
4.3.2.1 Average Trends Across All States
As will be shown, there is a great deal of variation between the volatility of different revenue mechanisms generally, and even more variation when broken down by individual
state. Looking at general trends across all states, Table 19 below displays the average (log
percent) volatility for each of the eight different mechanisms mentioned above, including
standard deviations and minimum and maximum values for each mechanism.
As can be seen, the average amount of volatility for the different mechanisms varies
greatly, largely along the lines expected from the literature, such as it exists. Although the
overall difference in magnitudes appears rather small, it should be kept in mind that these
figures are log percentages, so any difference between them is actually quite substantial.
Intergovernmental revenue, the one category not directly determined by state tax policy decisions, displays the smallest amount of average volatility, while all of the state-determined
mechanisms display greater volatility to varying degrees. Of these state-determined mechanisms, general sales tax and total user fees and charges (a very broadly defined category)
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display the least amount of volatility, followed by the motor fuels tax. This is in line with
general expectations: broad-based taxes on consumer goods and necessary public services
are less susceptible to revenue volatility. Individual income tax, on the other hand, displays
substantially more volatility, as would be expected based on its sensitivity to macroeconomic fluctuations; the corporate income tax displays even more volatility for the same
reason. None of the other mechanisms reach the heights of volatility, however, displayed
by the severance tax and property tax. Property tax generally makes up an extremely small
portion of total state tax revenue in the modern fiscal environment, so this average trend of
extremely high volatility, while striking, is not particularly policy relevant.43 The severance
tax, however, does make up a substantial portion of total revenue for at least a few states,
so its high level of volatility could potentially become important.
To confirm the substantive differences between each of these average levels of volatility,
a series of t-tests was conducted to verify that each of the means displayed above is statistically distinguishable from the others. This was true for every pairing between two different
mechanisms, with the one exception of general sales tax and total charges – the two least
volatile mechanisms, excluding intergovernmental revenue – which are not distinguishable
from each other at conventional levels of statistical significance. To summarize the average
trends, Table 20 below provides a ranking of the mechanisms, from most volatile to least
43 Note:

it would be inappropriate to extrapolate about the volatility of the property tax to local government
finance, where the property tax does make up a large portion of total revenue, on average. As noted above,
the property tax is generally considered be a relatively stable tax in the local finance literature. The volatility
here is a reflection of the property tax as it is structured for state revenues in states that utilize it, which is
quite different than the structure used by local governments. A separate empirical analysis at the local level
is required to make separate claims about relative volatilities at that level.
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Table 20: Revenue Volatility by Mechanism – National Average Ranking

volatile, in national average terms.

4.3.2.2 Revenue Volatility by Mechanism and State

While considering the average volatility trends across the mechanisms is a helpful starting
point in recognizing that there are substantial differences between them that need to be
taken into account, it must also be remembered that different states structure their taxes in
very different ways, even when dealing with the same general mechanism. If, rather than
constructing mean volatility measures across all states, individual means are calculated
for each state independently, even more heterogeneity can be observed. Table 21 below
displays some summary statistics for such an exercise.
As can be seen, there is a great deal of variation between the states as to the volatility
of even particular mechanisms. General trends from the national average analysis hold
up – general sales tax, total charges, and motor fuels tax all have relatively low volatility,
even in the maximum cases; individual and corporate income taxes display notably greater
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Table 21: Revenue Volatility by Mechanism – State Averages

volatility than the low-volatility grouping; property tax and severance tax have the most
extreme maximums of all. However, the inter-state variance can result in inversions to the
general pattern. For example, looking only at general sales tax and individual income tax,
the two mechanisms that most commonly form the majority of state tax revenue, average
trends would suggest that the individual income tax is more volatile than the sales tax.
Yet looking at the minimum state averages, it is possible for individual income tax to be
substantially less volatile than the sales tax in particular states.44
Considering those states that display the highest and lowest amount of volatility for
each individual mechanism, there are some states that disproportionately appear in the various categories as among either the most or least volatile. Nevada, for example, features
among the three most volatile states in four of the seven state-determined categories. Kentucky features among the three least volatile states in five of the seven state-determined
categories. In general, however, it is more notable that most individual states vary widely
44 This

situation actually applies to 10 states of markedly different characteristics from around the country:
Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and
West Virginia.
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in their rankings between the different mechanisms. The most consistently ranked state
is Virginia, ranked 27th in the volatility of property tax and 40th in the volatility of total
charges. The least consistently ranked states are West Virginia (ranked 2nd in the volatility
of general sales tax and 49th in the volatility of motor fuels tax) and North Carolina (ranked
2nd in the volatility of property tax and 49th in the volatility of general total charges). The
average change in ranking from most volatile to least volatile mechanism is over 30 places.
All of which is to say that disaggregating revenue volatility to the level of individual mechanisms introduces a great deal of variability between the states that is not fully captured by
considering only national averages.
To further examine and illustrate the instability of assigning national averages in volatility to every state, Table 22 below displays a summary of the most and least volatile revenue
mechanisms for each state. The table shows average state rankings for each of the individual mechanisms, in line with the ranking of national averages depicted in Table 21 above.
As with the by-state analysis discussed above, general trends are largely in line with national averages. Property and severance taxes rank among the most volatile, followed by
corporate and individual income taxes, followed by the motor fuels tax, general sales tax,
total charges, and federal intergovernmental revenues. However, there is also a substantial
amount of variation that can be observed by considering the minimum and maximum rankings that each mechanism obtains in the various states. Although general trends follow the
expectations set by national averages, every single state-determined mechanism ranks either first or second in volatility in at least one state (and excepting total charges, this is true
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Table 22: Revenue Volatility by Mechanism – State Rankings

of multiple states). Additionally, even the most volatile revenue mechanisms according to
national averages can rank among the least volatile sources in some states.
All of this is to formally illustrate the propositions of the literature discussed above that
revenue volatility, by mechanism, is dependent on the individual state in question. Therefore, just as it is important to consider the differential volatility of individual mechanisms, it
is also important to consider the state-level variation that exists between those mechanisms.

4.4 Empirical Strategy

Given the substantial variation depicted in the previous section, it is apparent that approaching the study of revenue diversification and revenue volatility in an agnostic manner – that
is, not considering the actual makeup of the diversity in terms of the mechanisms involved
– is problematic. Different revenue mechanisms inherently display differential amounts
of volatility at the state level, and even though average volatility trends remain stable nationwide, there is substantial heterogeneity between the states due to the diversity in the
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particular structures of their tax and revenue mechanisms. In this section, a strategy is
developed to explicitly control for these concerns.
As traditionally employed, empirical studies of revenue diversification and revenue
volatility measure diversification using the HHI alone, which does not fully capture the nature of revenue diversification across jurisdictions. The challenge is to construct a methodology that can isolate the effects of diversification, in and of itself, but also control for the
fact that different states, in different years, are utilizing a mix of revenues that are inherently more or less volatile. Accepting the principal hypothesis from the revenue volatility
argument, diversification should lead to decreased future volatility. However, if such diversification moves in a direction that favors more internally volatile mechanisms, as the
evidence above suggests is possible, the effect could be counteracted to a potentially overwhelming degree.

4.4.1 A Categorical Approach
Due to the complicated and variable nature of assessing individual revenue mechanisms
and their inherent volatility, the first empirical strategy attempted was to categorize each
state (by year) according to whether or not it predominantly relied on a particularly volatile
revenue stream. This was accomplished by using the previously identified rankings of
volatility and constructing a variable to measure whether each state, in any given year,
relied principally on one of that state’s most volatile revenue mechanisms, or not.
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Table 23: Reliance on Particularly Volatile Revenue Categories
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
M6
#S-Y w/ Vol. Sources
65
219
461
114
184
373
# S-Y w/o Vol. Sources 1,735 1,581 1,339 1,686 1,616 1,427
% S-Y w/ Vol. Sources 3.6% 12.2% 25.6% 6.3% 10.2% 20.7%

M7
649
1,151
36.1%

Table 23 provides a summary of the number of state-year observations in which a particular state relied on one of its most volatile revenue sources. The specifications are defined
as followed: M1 is when the largest revenue category in the state is also the single most
volatile category, according to that state’s average. M2 is when the largest revenue category
in the state is one of the two most volatile, and M3 is when the largest revenue category in
the state is one of the three most volatile. M4 is when either of the two largest revenue categories in the state is one the most volatile, and M5 is when any of the three largest revenue
categories is the most volatile. M6 is when either of the two largest revenue categories in
the state is one of the two most volatile, and M7 is when any of the three largest revenue
categories are among the three most volatile.
As can be immediately observed, it appears that relatively few states are relying heavily
upon their most volatile revenue streams. Only when the definition is expanded substantially, to include a consideration of the three most volatile sources (as is the case with M3
and M7) does the number of state-year observations which qualify as relying on particularly volatile revenue streams exceed 25%. From a financial management perspective, this
is encouraging, as it suggests that state revenue systems are generally designed in such a
way fashion that most revenue comes from more stable sources.
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Empirically, indicator variables for the different specifications can be included in a
panel regression model, as an alternative empirical model elaborated below in the section
on continuous measurement of underlying volatility. As discussed in the results section,
however, these regressions did not yield consistent or generally significant results. It is,
however, useful to make note of the the information provided above, that most states do not
seem to be relying on particularly volatile revenue sources.

4.4.2 Capturing Volatility Heterogeneity Continuously – The Underlying Volatility
(UV) Index
In order to control for the possibility of important variations in underlying volatility greater
intricacy, a new index is constructed and included in the estimation that explicitly measures the amount of structural volatility contained within the revenue structure, by state.
This index, denoted as UV (for underlying volatility) is calculated according to Equation 8
below:

UVxt = ∑rxt j vx j

(8)

j

Where subscript x refers to each individual state, subscript t refers to each year, and subscript j refers to each individually measured revenue mechanism. The variable r refers to
each revenue mechanism’s (j) share of total revenue45 , and the variable v refers to the aver45 For the sake of this estimation, only the major state-determined current revenue mechanisms are included,

for a total of seven categories. These are, namely: general sales tax, individual income tax, corporate income
tax, property tax, motor fuels tax, severance tax, total charges and fees. The accompanying calculation

126

Table 24: UV Index – Summary Statistics

age percentage volatility for that particular revenue mechanism in each state, as calculated
and described above. The measure is, in short, a weighted summation of the revenue mechanisms (which would, unadjusted, equal one), that is adjusted for the average volatility of
each particular mechanism. A larger value of the index reflects a revenue mix that is structurally more volatile, while a smaller values reflects a revenue mix which is structurally
more stable. Because each state has its own distinct value for v for each individual mechanism, and those values vary substantially, there is no set range for the UV index. Table 24
provides summary statistics for the UV index across all states and all years, while Figure 14
plots averages of the index for all states in the years of the sample, to see whether there has
been general movement toward more or less volatile mixes of revenue mechanisms over
time.
As can be identified from the table and figure above, there is a substantial amount of
variance in the UV index across states and over time. Thus, it is important to include
such a consideration when trying to isolate the effects of diversification. The figure, in
particular, displays an additional advantage to including something like the UV index in the
of revenue diversification using the HHI below necessarily includes the catch-all category of “other ownsource revenue” however the extreme variability over what is or is not included in such a category makes a
consideration of its underlying volatility untenable.
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Figure 14: UV Index – State Averages by Year

estimation. Spikes in the index are easily identified during periods of major macroeconomic
recession. That is not because states suddenly and temporarily switched to dramatically
more volatile revenue mixes, but rather because all revenues (especially the generally more
sensitive income taxes) grew more volatile during such periods. Although the estimation
strategy developed below attempts to control for such macroeconomic effects by employing
relevant controls, including the UV index provides additional control for volatility that
results from not just from the revenue structure, but also from general economic conditions.
In summary, explicitly controlling for the base volatility of the revenue structure provides a much stronger test of the hypothesis that revenue diversification reduces overall
revenue volatility. Without such controls, it is possible that diversification is picking up
volatility effects only insofar as the revenue structure shifts toward more or less volatile
individual mechanisms. By including the UV index alongside the HHI to measure diversification, any effects of diversification, in and of itself, are isolated.
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4.4.3 Granger Causal Methodology and Arellano-Bond Estimation
The particular challenge of studying this two-way relationship with a substantial feedback
loop is to establish some sort of causal evidence that is not subject to intense concerns
of unaddressed endogeneity. In most fields of applied economics, public finance being no
exception, the movement tends to be toward identification strategies that employ instrumental variables to convincingly establish causal pathways. However, there remain areas where
such an approach remains inaccessible for both theoretical and data limitation reasons.46
In such a case as this, where the two variables are, by theoretical construction, influencing
one another, the task of sufficiently and separately instrumenting every endogenous variable, with the public financial data available, is essentially insurmountable. However, this
does not mean that alternate strategies are unavailable.
In response, I turn to an estimation strategy which is popular in another field which
often faces similar challenges – macroeconomics. This method is known as Granger
causality, as first elaborated in succinct fashion by Granger (1969). Although not particularly widespread in public finance, there have been recent studies that have returned to
this methodology in order to address difficult empirical questions along these lines (e.g.
Saunoris, 2015). The strategy employs the belief that at least some degree of predictive
causality can be established by demonstrating that a change in the dependent variable is
significantly related to changes in an explanatory variable at some point in the past. One
46 Existing

studies have, by and large, failed to progress in the effort to address endogeneity issues by use
of instrumental variables, and at most resort to the application of basic lags.
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Figure 15: Granger Causality Logic

variable, x, can be stated to Granger cause (or G-cause) another variable, y, if incorporating
past information about x provides more accurate predictions about the value of y than could
otherwise be obtained. The basic logic of the concept is depicted below, in Figure 15.47

As the figure depicts, there two variables, x and y, which exhibit time trends, demonstrated by the horizontal arrows. In any given period, there is also reason to suspect that the
variables are affecting one another, represented by the vertical arrows. It is possible that
this relationship is happening in both directions (the problem with endogeneity, identified
47 Figure

adapted from Kenny (1975).
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above). The unidirectional diagonal arrow from xt−1 to yt represents the Granger causal
pathway. If a significant relationship, which aids in accurate prediction, can be identified
between the past value of x and the future value of y, the conditions for a Granger causal
relationship have been established.
The main critique of this line of reasoning is the widely-cited post hoc ergo propter hoc
fallacy of logic — that just because one event precedes another does not mean that it caused
it. And since this is a clear and valid criticism in many lines of inquiry48 , Granger causality
is often construed as something of a weaker test than other causal identification strategies.
If a third or confounding factor is indeed causing them both, then any claim of causality
based on the justification of sequence can very clearly be unfounded.49 This discussion
gets to the heart of what we mean by the term “causes” and it may be complicated by
linguistic shortcomings. The true meaning of claiming Granger causality is that one event
contains information which is demonstrably predictive of another event — nothing more,
nothing less, despite the presence of the term “causality” which may indeed be a misnomer.
Whether one is willing to make the leap from Granger causality to causality in a broader
sense depends on what one believes is happening in the rest of the system in question.
Therefore, one’s confidence in the results of an empirical analysis run under the principles of Granger causality depends to some degree on one’s confidence that there are not
extremely relevant and unmeasured underlying forces which are potentially driving all of
48 In

a classic example: The rooster always crows before dawn, therefore the rooster crowing causes the
sun to rise.
49 To return to the rooster example — the confounding variable is the movement of the earth.
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the observed factors and making the sequence of events unimportant. In the case of public
revenues, it is extremely unlikely that this is the case. To begin with, the basics of the revenue structure (i.e. revenue diversity) are clearly chosen and established by policymakers.
Revenue volatility is the more of policymaker control, since it can (especially if the revenue stream is undiversified) respond dramatically to macroeconomic changes. However,
these extraneous forces are not unmeasurable – we can include direct indicators of macroeconomic conditions including personal income and the unemployment rate. Additionally,
considering that policymaker behavior is the latent variable underlying so much of the intuition, we can include political controls that capture broad partisan or ideological shifts
among the people in power at any given time. When dealing with such a financial system,
which is relatively closed and has its variables responding to general forces which can be
sufficiently measured, the insight one can take from the results of Granger causal models
is appreciably increased.
To briefly review, such methods exploit the temporal nature of panel data to test whether
past values of the key explanatory variable(s) have statistically significant predictive power
for future values of the dependent variable. If such evidence is found, the explanatory variable can be said to “Granger cause” the dependent variable. While such evidence should
not be treated as causal in the traditional sense, it does provide greater confidence in a
pathway between variables in one particular direction. And as discussed elsewhere in this
dissertation, many past studies in this area have under-considered the concerns of endogeneity and causality, meaning that such an effort, if not perfect, still represents a step in
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the right direction.
Additionally, the empirical methodology depicted below utilizes Arellano-Bond estimators. Arellano-Bond is a GMM adaptation of more common panel data methods (e.g.
fixed or random effects) that allows for lagged values of the dependent variable to employed
as explanatory variables. Although including such lagged values as explanatory variables
in more standard panel models such as fixed effects is not uncommon in empirical work in
public finance, including this own specific literature, doing so is theoretically inappropriate. Such practice introduces automatic autocorrelation between the lagged variable and the
“unobserved variation” meant to be captured by the fixed effects, and thus biases all of the
results. Arellano-Bond estimators were designed to avoid such negative consequences and
allow for consistent estimates in the presence of lagged values of the dependent variable.

4.4.4 Estimating Equation
The objective here is to model overall revenue volatility and seek evidence for the predictive
explanatory power of revenue diversity in and of itself, by simultaneously controlling for
the underlying volatility inherent in the revenue structure. The introduction of the UV
index does not allow for bidirectional testing of the relationship, although previous work
discussed above suggests that a bidirectional relationship is present. The methodology
developed in this paper requires that volatility be modeled not only with the HHI as a key
explanatory variable, but that it be accompanied by the measure of underlying structural
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volatility. As such, flipping the strategy would require two components on the left-hand
side of the equation, which the current measurement strategy does not allow. However,
the question of whether or not volatility decreases in response to diversification is what
specifically requires a consideration of underlying volatility, and it is upon this that the
current estimation focuses.
The estimation equation for this exercise is displayed below in Equation 9:

q

Volatilityi,t = α0 + ∑ βiVolatilityi,t−l +
l=1

r

s

m=0

n=0

∑ γiRevi,t−m+ ∑ δiHHIi,t−n + εiUVi,t +ΛiCi,t + µi
(9)

Where Volatilityi,t is the dependent variable – total own-source revenue volatility – for
a given observation in a given year, α 0 is an intercept, Volatilityi,t−l are the lagged values
of the dependent variable, with the number of lags included represented by q, Revi,t−m is
the current and lagged total (log) revenue of the state, HHIi,t−n is the current and lagged
measure of revenue diversity (up to r periods) and UVi,t is the contemporaneous measure
of the underlying volatility of the revenue mix, in any given state and any given year, Ci,t
is a vector of contemporaneous economic and political controls, and µi are the panel-level
errors for each group of observations – here, states.
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4.4.5 Data and Variable Measurement
All data are measured at the state level, annually, forming a panel dataset for all states
from the years 1977-2012. The financial data are taken from the Census Bureau’s Census
of State and Local Government Finance, as aggregated by the Tax Policy Center’s State
and Local Finance Data Query System.50 All figures are measured in real (2012) dollars
in order to control for inflation over the time period. Per capita measures are utilized, in
order to prevent the size of the state resulting in dramatic over- or under-representation of
particularly large and small states (in terms of population).
Total (per capita) own-source revenue is the aggregation of all tax revenues collected
by the state, in addition to other revenue streams such as user fees and charges that are
collected by the state government. As is standard practice when using such large figures in
econometric analysis, the variable is measured in natural log terms. In the literature, this
variable is often smoothed using a method such as moving averages to drown out some of
the noise. This was not an available strategy here, however, because doing so created a
problem of nonstationarity in the data.
Considering the major variables of concern, revenue volatility is measured according
to the Carroll (2009) methodology described above (using 7) for total revenue, before it
was adapted for the measuring of volatility in individual revenue mechanisms and the construction of the UV index. Measuring revenue diversity is achieved, as is standard in the
50 http://slfdqs.taxpolicycenter.org/pages.cfm

The Census of State and Local Government Finance is conducted, in full, every five years (those years ending in 2 or 7). The state-level data is updated annually in full,
while local government data is updated annually using sampling techniques.
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literature, by calculating a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) using the percentage shares
that different revenue instruments contribute to total revenue. This index is calculated by
summing the squared revenue percentage (r) of each of j different revenue mechanisms,
subtracting from one, and dividing by 1 − 1j , which is a scaling procedure to simplify interpretation. This is depicted below in Equation 10.
1 − ∑r2j
HHI =

j

1 − 1j

(10)

With this formulation, perfect concentration (all revenue being derived from a single
revenue category) would result in an index value of 0, while perfect diversification (each
of the included categories contributing an equal share of revenue) would result in an index
value of 1. Consistent with the data for volatility above, eight separate own-source tax
and revenue categories are employed in the construction of the variable: the sales tax, the
individual income tax, the corporate income tax, the property tax, the motor fuels tax, the
severance tax, total user fees and charges, and other taxes.
In addition to these main variables of concern, controls are included in the model to address those issues which are most likely to affect revenue patterns from outside the system.
Economic factors, capturing general macroeconomic performance and the socioeconomic
makeup of the population, include per-capita income, the unemployment rate, the percentage of the population receiving some form of welfare, and an income distribution measure.
Political factors, which may be driving differences in state revenue decisions, include the
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Variable
Population
Per-capita
income
Unemployment
rate
Welfare
Recipients
Income
Distrubtion
Governor’s
Party
Legislature
Composition

Table 25: Control Variables
Measurement
Source
Millions of residents
Census Bureau*
Bureau of Economic
Real 2012 dollars
Analysis and Census
Bureau*
Bureau of Labor
% unemployment
Statistics*
% of population
Department of Health
receiving AFDC or
and Human Serivces*
TANF payments
% of total income
Frank-Sommeillerrecieved by the top
Price
10% of earners
Series
1 if Democrat, 0 if
Council of State
Republican
Governments*
% of Democrats in
Council of State
lower house of the
Governments*
legislature

governor’s party and the party composition of the lower house of the legislature. Table 25
below describes the specific measurement of each of these variables and the source of the
data.5152
Summary statistics for all of the variables described above can be found in the following
tables. As can be readily observed, significant variation exists across all of the variables
included in the analysis. It is instructive to observe the substantial variation present across
the sample as a whole — between all states over all years. This is presented in Table
26 below. However, this can also be misleading because in general, it leads to observing
the magnitude of difference between the smallest state in the earliest time period and the
51 Data

sources marked with an asterisk were in turn drawn from an aggregated panel assembled by the
University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research. See the references for a complete citation.
52 The Frank-Sommeiller Price Series of state-level income distribution data is provided by Mark Frank of
Sam Houston State University. See the references for a complete citation.
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Table 26: Summary Statistics: All States, 1977-2012
Variable
Mean
Standard
Minimum Maximum
Deviation
(Log)
1.320
0.572
1.011
8.968
Revenue
Volatility
(Log) Total
8.226
0.387
6.161
10.282
Revenue
Revenue
0.859
0.087
0.183
0.957
Diversity
Population
5.358
5.877
0.402
38.000
(Millions)
Per Capita
25.061
10.780
7.018
59.663
Personal
Income
(Thousands)
Unemployment 6.048
2.145
2.300
17.400
Rate
% Welfare
0.028
0.018
0.001
0.085
Recipients
% Income to
39.540
5.659
22.697
62.259
Top 10%
Democratic
0.508
0.500
0.000
1.000
Governor
Fraction of
.555
0.173
0.160
1.000
Lower House
Democratic
largest state in the latest time period. This may serve to abstract from the more complicated
situation that results from panel data, in which both variation across time and across space
are important. In order to demonstrate that there is substantial cross-sectional variation
outside of temporal variation, Table 27 presents summary statistics for 2012 only, the most
recent year in the data.
In order to investigate temporal variation, it is worth considering parallel trends in the
three principal variables over time. Figures 16 and 17 below depict the national mean
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Table 27: Summary Statistics: All States, 2012
Variable
Mean
Standard
Minimum Maximum
Deviation
(Log)
1.295
0.338
1.082
3.331
Revenue
Volatility
(Log) Total
8.424
0.315
7.893
9.722
Revenue
Revenue
0.850
0.071
0.461
0.936
Diversity
Population
6.265
6.997
0.577
38.000
(Millions)
Per Capita
49.957
6.957
33.640
59.663
Personal
Income
(Thousands)
Unemployment 7.294
1.733
3.000
11.500
Rate
% Welfare
0.010
0.006
0.001
0.037
Recipients
% Income to
46.241
5.287
35.518
60.921
Top 10%
Democratic
0.400
0.495
0.000
1.000
Governor
Fraction of
.459
0.164
0.170
0.870
Lower House
Democratic
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Figure 16: Average State Revenue Volatility: 1977-2012

values for each of the three major variables: total revenue, revenue volatility, and revenue
diversity, from 1977 until 2012. As can be observed, they depict a substantial amount of
change over the decades, although each displays different overall trends. Average volatility,
after peaking in the early 1980s, remained quite low until spiking during the most recent
recession. Interestingly, the average level of diversification of state revenues has actually
decreased, more or less consistently, over this period. This is is in direct contrast to the
theoretical story of either perspective discussed above, which view diversification as a tool
to solve separate problems, and would thus expect it to be increasing over time. In looking
at these figures, however, it is important not to place too much stock in the average trends;
individual states can and often do experience very different paths.
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Figure 17: Average State Revenue Diversity: 1977-2012

4.5 Results and Discussion
4.5.1 Categorical Results
Given the fact that individual mechanism volatility is measured with a such an empirically
precise methodology, a categorical approach to assessing mechanism volatility was initially attempted. Each state-year observation was coded as a 1 or 0, depending on whether
it relied on one of that states’s most volatile revenue sources, alternatively defined and described above. Such specifications yielded almost exclusively insignificant results regarding the influence of underlying volatility on a state’s total revenue volatility53 . However,
this exercise yielded interesting and valuable information regarding the reliance of states
53 The

one exception was the M3 specification, where the largest revenue share is one of the three most
volatile revenue sources. It it unclear why this, and only this, specification of the model should yield significant results. Particularly in the light of the fact that M7, which is a similar specification that is even more
generous with the definition of reliance on volatile revenue sources, this may be an example of Type 1 error,
where a false relationship is detected due to a statistical anomaly.
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on particularly volatile revenue mechanisms.
As mentioned above, Table 5 above depicts that on the whole, the number of states
relying on particularly volatile revenues sources is relatively low. On average, the U.S.
states are not moving away from a revenue mix which is highly concentrated among notably
volatile sources, as the traditional diversification-volatility argument tacitly assumes. This
observation lends support to the idea that diversification at the state level could be leading
toward a reliance on more volatile revenue mechanisms, rather than less.

4.5.2 Continuous Results
Given the failure of the categorical approach to produce meaningful significant results, the
empirical focus of this paper rests on a continuous approach to the measuring underlying
diversity, as captured by the UV index and elaborated above in the discussion of the empirical strategy. This strategy is designed to control for the underlying level of volatility
specifically, no matter the direction of the trend. By explicitly controlling for the exact
nature of the contemporaneous structure of the revenue mix and its reliance on more or less
volatile revenue sources, it should further isolate the pure effect of diversification, beyond
such issues.
Standard Arellano-Bond procedure identifies the appropriate number of lags of the dependent variable to include in the estimation. A statistical test determines whether or not
there is zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors, and when that condition is at-
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tained enough lags have been included in the model. In this case, a single lag was found
to be appropriate. Regarding the number of lags to be included for the key explanatory
variables (here, total revenue and diversity, as measured by the HHI) in order to establish
Granger causal evidence of a relationship, there is no such test or clear direction. Enough
lags should be included so as to potentially a capture a relationship, should it exist, but
not so many should be included as to substantially increase the chance of Type 1 error and
identifying a relationship that doesn’t actually exist, by simple chance. Granger causal evidence is established by performing a Wald test of joint significant for the coefficients on
all of the included lag variables. In this case, two lags are utilized for both total revenue
and diversity, which is sufficient to establish Granger causal evidence. Different numbers
of lags were also attempted, without significantly changing the results.
The above findings and strategies were utilized in specifying the final model, which
employs current volatility as the dependent variable. The key explanatory variables are a
single lag of volatility, a contemporaneous measure of the underlying volatility index, two
lags for both (log) total revenue and revenue diversity, and contemporaneous controls. The
results of the Arellano-Bond regression analysis are presented below, in Table 28.

4.5.3 Discussion
The results presented above offer various insights. First, controlling for the underlying
volatility of the revenue structure does appear to be important in studying total revenue
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Table 28: Arellano-Bond Regression Results
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volatility. The coefficient on the UV index is positive and statistically significant at the
10% level (and almost so at the 5% level, with a p-value of 0.64). Controlling for this
concept was the major objective of the paper, as theoretically it provides and important development that is necessary to draw believable conclusions about the relationship between
diversification and volatility. The fact that the variable is significant, at conventional levels,
offers support to this endeavor.
The set of variables (contemporaneous and lags) regarding total revenue flows out of
previous research summarized in Table 1 above, which establishes the vital, but often ignored, concept that volatility is increased whenever a greater amount of revenue is raised.
The negative coefficient on the contemporaneous variable illustrates the significant concern
over endogeneity when studying the revenue system as a whole. It was for this reason that
an Arellano-Bond Granger causal methodology was employed, because simultaneously determined results are causally suspect. Adopting the Granger methodology, the set of lags
for total revenue is jointly significant, illustrating that a larger amount of revenue (in the
past) is indeed predictive of a greater amount of revenue volatility in the future.
Looking at the set of variables measuring revenue diversity with the HHI, a parallel pattern is observed. Contemporaneously, it would appear that greater revenue diversification is
associated with reduced volatility. However, including lagged variables, and testing those
lagged variables according to Granger methods, there appears to be a positive Grangercausal relationship between revenue diversity and total revenue volatility. This is consistent
the with results of the aforementioned companion research, which identified such a rela145

tionship even without considering the underlying volatility of the individual mechanisms.
The fact that this relationship persists, even when explicitly controlling for the volatility
inherent to the revenue structure, lends credence to the counter-theoretical argument that
at least at the level of U.S. states, diversification might not be an effective tool for revenue
stabilization. Pairing this with the additional finding that states do seem to respond to increased revenue volatility by diversifying the revenue structure, this results in substantial
policy concerns.
In these cases, it may reasonably be suspected that including the contemporaneous variable along with the lags significantly alters the findings. After all, each of the contemporaneous explanatory variables is significant and would seem to counteract the effects found
by the consideration of the lags. This does not seem to be the case, however. Running
the Arellano-Bond regression without contemporaneous explanatory variables still results
in the same positive relationships, although in such a setting the positive relationship between diversity and volatility is only marginally significant (still, it is decidedly not the
negative relationship suggested by the standard literature). This illustrates the importance
of developing an estimation strategy which adequately controls for issues of endogeneity in
this financial system. Given the interconnectedness and complicated relationships between
the variables of interest (and others, such as total revenue), the results of a cross-sectional,
identically-timed study are extremely questionable.
While contrary to the expectations of the traditional diversity-volatility literature, these
results are not necessarily inconsistent with newer trends in the literature which consider
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and incorporate the fact that the effects of diversification depend on the starting point of
that effort. As illustrated above, most U.S. states are starting from a position of reliance on
more inherently stable revenue mechanisms. As recent studies are starting to appreciate,
this means that diversification (away from those more stable sources, and toward more
inherently volatile sources) could lead to increased revenue volatility, rather than reduced
volatility. The findings of this paper provide additional support to this proposition. It is
extremely important to understand this qualification to traditional expectations, especially
when making recommendations to state policymakers. The conventional knowledge that
diversification will decrease revenue volatility appears to not, in fact, be the case. In making
specific policy recommendations for any particular state, a more careful analysis of the
current tax and revenue mix must be conducted, in order to identify whether additional
diversification could actually lead toward greater revenue volatility.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
5.1 Overview

The objective of this dissertation was to more carefully illuminate a few particular empirical
and methodological issues in the study of revenue diversification and its role in public
finance, generally. The expectation, as far as I was concerned, was to arrive at qualified
results consistent with the existent literature, particularly those new trends in the literature
which are considering extensions to the traditional expectations derived from two different
theoretical perspectives. However, in applying new and more sophisticated methods to the
study, several of the results contained herein proved contrary to the traditional knowledge
and wisdom regarding this particular phenomenon. Although occasionally divergent from
basic expectations, these findings do, upon closer examination, appear to be consistent with
trends among those scholars engaged in cutting-edge research in revenue diversification,
lending credence to the findings of this dissertation. By coming at these findings through
a rather different empirical approach to most research in this area, there does appear to be
some robustness to the findings.
Revenue diversification has, for several decades, been the subject intense theoretical
debate among scholars in different camps – namely the revenue-complexity hypothesis out
of political economy, and the revenue volatility hypothesis from public financial management. Both fields propose a definitive theoretical explanation for the phenomenon, but both
have failed to establish definitive empirical verification and ownership of the trend, in large
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part because the other camp consistently rejects and seeks to disprove such findings. As
this dissertation shows, both may be equally adrift in actually understanding the motives
and implications of pursuing a more diversified revenue stream, since this effort is but one
component in an extremely complex revenue system. The main theoretical argument for
changes to the study of diversification is elaborated in Chapter 3, where a model is developed which incorporates the relationships and insights proposed by both of the two major
camps. The main empirical arguments are several, and addressing each in turn forms the
three substantive chapters of this dissertation. Namely, these objectives were:

1. The non-uniformity in the way that revenue diversity has traditionally been measured;
2. The under-developed concern over issues of endogeneity between the principal variables in either of the two dominant camps in the literature; and
3. The lack of consideration for a broader and more nuanced treatment of revenue diversification, outside of simple measures of concentration.

In response to these three concerns, the chapters each focus on particular methState
Tax Revenue by Mechanism - U.S. Averageods to improve upon the existent methodology
to study revenue diversification and any other variable. Chapter 2 explored the sensitivity
of diversification measurements to alternate specifications. Chapter 3 explicitly unifies the
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two different theoretical perspectives and tests their hypotheses as part of unified system.
Chapter 4 expands upon surprising results in Chapter 3, and tests the volatility hypothesis
with greater methodological rigor by constructing and introducing a new variable (underlying volatility) to the equation.
As a whole, the dissertation has achieved its goals in making substantial progress along
each of these dimensions. Both theoretical perspectives, as individually established, are
called into question. In the case of the revenue-complexity hypothesis, this is consistent
with ongoing trends in the literature. Of particular note, however, is the evidence that
the presumed negative relationship between revenue diversification and revenue volatility
is rejected, at the U.S. state level. Given general trends in state reliance on more or less
volatile revenue mechanisms, this is, although inconsistent with general pronouncements,
not inconsistent with the most recent literature studying these phenomena.
On a larger scale, the empirical exercises contained in the dissertation serve as an attempt to broaden the methodological horizons of those studying applied public finance.
Although the issue of endogeneity is commonly raised in the financial management literature, methods to address it are often limited. In attempting to correct for endogeneity on
such a broad scale, where the revenue system is modeled as a complicated and interconnected entity, common methods fail to make substantial progress. Drawing on my own
training in macroeconomics, the main empirical advances contained within borrow from
methods which are more common in that field, but which provide valuable advances in
addressing methodological issues in the public financial realm.
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5.2 Review and Summary of Major Findings
5.2.1 Chapter Summaries
Chapter 2 investigated the sensitivity of the ubiquitous Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, the
standard measure of revenue diversity, to various categorizations of revenue. On the whole,
utilizing a differential number of major tax revenues does not seem to be immediately concerning, although a notable deviations can result, particularly if the state in question relies
heavily on an unconventional revenue source that would otherwise be counted as “other” in
traditional formulations. However, incorporating more broadly-defined revenue categories,
such as intergovernmental revenue and debt, can result in particularly inconsistent measures of diversity. Whether or not to include such categories remains a matter of theoretical
and empirical debate.
The existent literature is particularly inconsistent with the number and classification
of revenue categories it includes in the HHI, and this makes it particularly difficult to directly compare empirical results. The main argument resulting from this chapter is that
the researcher should be extremely careful in how the revenue categories are defined. This
demands balancing two different objectives: first, the desire to utilize and employ a measure that is largely consistent with with heterogeneous literature, and second, the desire to
measure revenue diversification by utilizing the categories which are most appropriate to
the situation in question. There is no definitive answer to either of these concerns, and the
variability in the literature makes balancing these objectives particularly difficult. Hope-
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fully, however, future studies will consider these objectives more carefully, and studies will
solidify around a more consistent definition of the major revenue categories.
Chapter 3 provides the major thrust of the dissertation, theoretically, by developing a
unified model that combines the insights from both the revenue-complexity hypothesis and
the volatility argument. It also provides the foundation for a new empirical methodology
to study these phenomena in the context of a theoretically complicated and interconnected
system. Granger causal methodology was introduced, and the importance of ArellanoBond estimation was established as a response to an often-ignored complication in panel
data methods
The results of this chapter interestingly supported half of the expected causal relationships between the key variables, while disputing the other half in both cases. In accordance
with a demand-driven model of revenue complexity, greater total revenue is associated with
greater revenue diversity, but greater diversity is not associated with greater total revenues
(per the traditional argument of the revenue-complexity hypothesis). Also, greater revenue
volatility is associated with greater revenue diversification, a logical policymaker response
given traditional wisdom, but greater diversification is actually associated with increased
revenue volatility, contrary to theoretical expectations.
There are a couple major takeaways from these complicated findings. First and foremost, it is apparent that two-way causation and feedback loops between the different twoway relationships must be considered, because the direction of the effects can be unexpectedly reversed. Additionally, in each case, major tenets of the expected relationships
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are called into question. This is not particularly surprising, since the revenue-complexity
hypothesis has, in most recent studies, been most commonly rejected. But these findings
suggest that while this rejection may be valid – with revenue diversity leading to increased
total revenue, and thus greater expenditures – the relationship may still exist in the opposite
direction. Within this logic, greater diversity is tool for meeting demand for greater total
expenditures, and thus total revenues. This explanation is less discussed in the literature,
but important to consider. Meanwhile, the most important tenet of the diversity-volatility
hypothesis is also called into question. States do appear to respond to increased volatility
with greater revenue diversity, as the traditional findings and wisdom would suggest they
should. But then, there is evidence that this actually has the opposite of the intended effect,
and that greater diversification results in increased revenue volatility. If this is true, there is
a major divergence between policy prescriptions and policy outcomes, and this is an issue
which must be addressed.
Chapter 4 seeks to further investigate this issue by more carefully considering the specifying relationship between diversity and volatility. A new measure is developed which
seeks to capture the amount of underlying diversity that exists in the current revenue system, beyond the simple level of diversification as measured by the HHI. Initial expectations
were that controlling for the underlying volatility of the revenue system might reverse, or
at least diminish, the positive relationship between diversity and volatility. This was not the
case, however, as the same relationship was retained, even while controlling for underlying
volatility, which is (predictably) a significant determinant of total volatility.
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As elaborated in the chapter, however, this result is not necessarily inconsistent with
more recent findings that consider the nature of the revenue diversity, rather than a simple
quantitative measure. The construction of the UV index allowed for an investigation of the
reliance of particular states on more or less volatile revenue mechanisms. It was observed
that the U.S. states generally do not rely on particularly volatile mechanisms, meaning
that a movement toward diversity is often a move toward more volatile revenue streams.
This further illustrates the essential importance of considering the phenomenon of revenue
diversification in a more comprehensive manner.

5.2.2 Overarching Themes
The study of revenue diversity is, it turns out, extremely diverse. Insights come from
two different major perspectives, but are additionally influenced by additional fields and
related lines of inquiry. Measuring revenue diversity using an HHI and plugging it into
some sort of regression is extremely easy and attractive, but the true consideration of this
complicated concept requires a great deal more deliberate thought. The results highlighted
above illustrate general themes that espouse new directions which are important to consider
in its study, moving forward.
First, neither major theoretical approach to the study seems to have a definitive grasp
on explaining the phenomenon of revenue diversification, and both can benefit from an expanded vantage that explicitly acknowledges the two-way relationships between key vari-
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ables. The results of the divergent claims in one direction or the other may be complicated
by the fact that the very measurement of diversification is unstandardized, and can vary significantly depending on the specific categories included in measuring it. At the very least,
any study considering and attempting to test one particular hypothesis should acknowledge
and consider the other, and incorporate some effort to measure and include those additional
variables that could be relevant.
Second, any study of diversification should at least make an effort at understanding
the underlying volatility that exists within the status quo revenue structure. Diversification
away from a revenue structure that is currently extremely volatile is very different than
diversification away from a revenue structure that is already reliant on relatively stable
revenue mechanisms. The HHI, on its own, does not incorporate such considerations, and
additional variables must be measured and included in order to capture this qualitative
aspect of revenue diversity. The UV index developed within offers a starting point for
doing this, but it is by no means the ending point of a more nuanced consideration of
revenue diversity.
In sum, there are some major challenges that still exist while studying revenue diversity,
which is quite likely why the literature surrounding it remains so contentious and active,
decades after it was first introduced as a subject of interest. This dissertation offers several concrete suggestions for ways to improve the empirical study of this trend, moving
forward. There is still a lot of room for additional approaches and improvements to the
study, however. Recent movements in the literature seem to be incorporating many of these
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considerations, with various methodologies. As long as these issues are kept in mind and
addressed in some manner, our understanding of the role of revenue diversification in the
public financial system should continue to advance in a positive fashion.

5.3 Future Directions

The findings of this dissertation are consistent with some more recent trends in the literature, and illustrate the importance of a much more careful consideration of revenue diversification and its relationship with other financial variables of interest. The methodologies
developed within serve to advance this goal, and offer new approaches to the study of this
phenomenon. However, they are still limited in their ability to provide definitive evidence
for the relationships espoused. As noted multiple times, Granger causality is not the same
as causality, in its pure form. Alternate methods are available for studying the relationships
examined here, and future efforts to solidify these findings should focus on developing and
incorporating them.
Particularly, at least at the state level, discontinuities in the reliance on one tax or revenue mechanism over another provide a valuable source of empirical power which is ripe
for exploitation. Relative reliance on one revenue mechanism over another is, generally,
largely stable in any given state over time. However, there are states that have enacted major policy changes to dramatically change the pattern of diversity and reliance on particular
mechanisms at a given chronological point. Future research focused on these dimensions
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can take advantage of such discontinuous adjustments to the revenue mix and study the
effect of such a marked change with appropriate methodologies. I am currently conducting
preliminary research utilizing synthetic control methods to exploit just such situations. The
number of cases where such methods can be employed is small, but the methods provide
the opportunity to draw valuable conclusions, even in such a low-case situation.
The discussion of synthetic control methodology illustrates a common difficulty and
shortcoming to this and most revenue diversification studies – diversification is measured
using revenue mechanism shares as they are, in any given time period. However, all of the
theory rests on the idea that diversification is an effort by lawmakers, for some particular
purpose. Current measures of diversification could reflect a number of different elements
outside of this pointed effort, such asState Tax Revenue by Mechanism - U.S. Average
macroeconomic effects (which can be controlled for, but imperfectly). Actually measuring
such efforts to amend the tax code requires a careful and exhaustive review and analysis of
enacted policy and laws at the given level of analysis. Being able to codify such deliberate
changes would provide a number of opportunities to study diversification in a more pointed
fashion, and doing just that is a long-term goal.
Additionally, as noted several times throughout the dissertation itself, a focus on local
government revenues is quite prevalent in the current literature. As a starting point, applying the methods contained within this dissertation to the local level would be a useful, and
hopefully fruitful, exercise. The major limitation is amassing a substantially large and long
panel dataset to allow for the application of these time-series methodologies. However, the
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ever-expanding nature of public financial data collection may provide the opportunity to do
this, in at least particular settings. The state-level findings of this dissertation are largely
consistent with newer research at the local level, as described within, but those results were
obtained from notably different methodologies. Being able to confirm the results, using the
same methods, at two different levels of government (and necessarily controlling for the
differences in revenue reliance that exist between them) would be extremely valuable.
Penultimately, despite the fact that most of the control variables demonstrated themselves as uninsightful, one control variable did prove to be occasionally significant, and
based on discussions with interested scholars, is also of theoretical interest. The consideration of income equality is rare, if not unique to this dissertation, in studies of revenue
diversification. Included as yet another economic control in the models contained within,
there is little to note here. However, this is a potential avenue for additional future research
– what, exactly, is the relationship between income inequality and the key variables studied here, and how might such a relationship be qualified? One naturally starts to expect
an important interaction between income concentration and a reliance on income taxes, as
opposed to more diffuse taxes such as the sales tax.
Finally, I entered the dissertation process fully intending to study public debt, and I
would like to return to such an endeavor at some point in the near future. While there
is clearly a great deal of research in the literature regarding the relationship between the
revenue structure and current revenues and spending, there is relatively little development
regarding the relationship between the revenue structure and future revenues and spending,
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a relationship which is largely dictated by the issuance of public debt. Employing what I
have learned thus far regarding the complications of studying revenue diversity, I hope to
expand the general discussion into the intertemporal financial discussion, which will, I’m
sure, raise a host of new challenges to address.
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